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Abstract
This thesis uses general-equilibrium numerical-simulation techniques to analyse trade
and environmental issues. It tries to take applied general equilibrium modelling in
these areas beyond their traditional confines in a number of ways. These include
endogenous incorporation of international capital flows into trade models, decompo-
sition of observed economic outcomes, and computation of bargaining solutions and
non-cooperative equilibria. Chapter 1 analyses the welfare, income distribution and
macroeconomic implications of trade liberalisation and increased indirect taxation
in El Salvador. It is found that these policies have little effect on welfare and in-
come distribution, but a significant impact on macroeconomic aggregates. Chapter 2
examines trade liberalisation when foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and inter-
national capital income taxation are present, using data for Costa Rica. The main
finding is that, once FDI flows and its taxation are taken into consideration, trade
liberalisation can hurt a small open economy, whose optimal policy is no longer free
trade but a combination of taxes and subsidies on imports. Chapter 3 deals with the
decomposition into trade and technology constituents parts of recent increased wage
inequality in the UK. It analyses how decomposition is affected by the way in which
labour markets are modelled. It is found that when labour markets are perfectly
competitive, the main force behind increased wage inequality is technological change,
with trade playing only a small role; but when labour market inflexibilities are taken
into account, any of the two factors considered can become dominant, depending on
the parameter specification used in the model. Chapter 4 examines the incentives
for developing-country participation in possible future negotiation on trade and the
environment, assumed to break down on North-South lines. It finds that developing
countries will do better if they negotiate jointly on trade and environmental policies
than if they negotiate over trade policy only. However, negotiations accompanied
with side payments of cash will be even better for them. Finally, Chapter 5 analyses
the role of adaptation responses to damage from externalities. Using a hierarchy of
models calibrated to UK data, we compare internalisation effects in the presence of
these responses with a case where they are absent. We find that taking account of
adaptation responses significantly reduces the level of full-internalisation taxes and
the associated welfare gains from externality correction.
ix
INTRODUCTION
There has been ample use of applied general equilibrium (AGE) models to
analyse trade and environmental issues both in a static and dynamic framework.
Amongst the many features these models share, we can identify three here, which
are also common to similar models used in other fields. First, when addressing open
economy issues, AGE models are usually build under the assumption that factors of
production—especially capital—are intersectorally mobile, but internationally immo-
bile. Second, they generally concerned themselves with doing counterfactual exper-
iment analysis of ex-ante policy changes. Third, applied general equilibrium work
typically focuses on Walrasian competitive equilibria only.
The present work takes AGE models dealing with trade and/or environmen-
tal issues beyond these traditional confines. First, we build a trade model incorpo-
rating endogenous determination of international capital flows in the form of foreign
direct investment. Second, we move beyond counterfactual experiment analysis and
use general equilibrium techniques to decompose observed economic outcomes derived
from different sources into constituent parts attributable to each source. Third, we
go beyond traditional Walrasian competitive equilibria, and compute both bargain-
ing solutions and non-cooperative equilibria. In a similar vein, we also use modelling
techniques to endogenously determine the optimal size of specific policy instruments,
with the full set of general equilibrium conditions serving as constraints.
x
The thesis is organised in five main chapters. With the exception of Chap-
ter 1, where we use a conventional model, each Chapter builds a structure departing
from traditional AGE modelling in any of the three ways just described. We use
these models with the aim of complementing theoretical discussions and contribute
to policy analysis. Chapter 1 uses a traditional general equilibrium trade model to
examine the effects of trade liberalisation and indirect tax reform in El Salvador. Our
analysis here is exclusively policy-oriented, and we do not claim any methodological
or thematic novelty for it. The only new aspect about it is its application to the Sal-
vadorean economy—for which the issues in question have not been addressed within
a general equilibrium framework. We examine the welfare, income distribution and
macroeconomic effects of both trade liberalisation and value-added tax reform. Our
finding is that the welfare and income distribution consequences of both policies are
quite small, and that their main impact is on the macroeconomic side (government
budget and external sector).
In Chapter 2, we modify and extend this simple trade model to incorpo-
rate both foreign direct investment (FDI) and international capital income taxation
(ICIT). To the best of our knowledge, no previous calibrated general equilibrium
models have been used to examine trade issues when FDI flows or ICIT are present.
In the absence of adequate Salvadorean data on sectoral FDI, we apply this model
structure to the economy of Costa Rica, for which we examine the welfare effects of
unilateral trade liberalisation and compute the optimal import tariff structure. Our
xi
principal findings are that, with FDI flows and ICIT present, full import tariff elimi-
nation hurts the Costa Rican economy, whose optimal tariff structure in fact consists
of a combination of import tariffs and import subsidies of relatively small size.
Chapter 3 uses general equilibrium modelling to conduct decomposition, ex
post analysis. Here, we deal with the phenomenon of increased wage inequality re-
cently documented for a number of OECD countries (most notably the US and the
UK), and which has been linked both to rising trade with low-wage countries (e.g.
Wood, 1994) and technological change (e.g. Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993). We ex-
amine the UK case, and use a generalised version of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model
to decompose the observed change in wage inequality over the period 1976-90 into
portions due to trade and technological change. We do this under alternative labour
market institutional frameworks, and find that decomposition results are sensitive to
the way the labour market is modelled. Specifically, we find that when wages are fully
flexible and labour markets clear, technology is the main force behind the increase in
wage inequality. But when real wages are downwardly rigid, the dominant factor can
be any of the two, depending on the model parameterisation used.
Chapter 4 uses a model incorporating cooperative an non-cooperative solu-
tion concepts to analyse the interaction between trade and environmental issues in an
strategic setting. We examine the incentives for less developed countries (LDCs) to
participate in possible future linked trade and environment negotiation in the World
Trade Organization (WTO). It is suggested that these negotiations will largely break
xii
down on developed-developing country lines. We use a North-South model of trade
and environment where LDCs are the custodians of environmental assets and can use
the leverage this gives them in exchange for trade concessions by developed coun-
tries. The latter are assumed—due to their higher income—to attach a large value
to the environmental assets owned by LDCs, and can use trade policy threats to
improve environmental management by developing countries. We go beyond conven-
tional Walrasian competitive equilibria, and compute both cooperative (bargaining)
and non-cooperative solutions over trade only, and over trade and the environment
jointly considered. We find that developing countries would gain by moving from ne-
gotiations only on trade towards linked negotiations, with gains being larger if they
are compensated with side payments of cash.
Chapter 5 deals exclusively with environmental issues, and develops a hier-
archy of models to analyse the significance of adaptation responses to various environ-
mental externalities. We compute optimal internalisation policy instruments both in
the presence and absence of adaptation responses to environmental damage. We find
that the presence of adaptation makes a substantial difference to both the optimal
size of internalisation instruments and the welfare gains from internalisation, driving
both of them downwards in comparison with the traditional case where adaptation is
absent. Our conclusion is that not taking into account adaptation responses to envi-
ronmental damage can seriously mislead analyses of the consequences of internalising
environmental externalities.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarises and draws some conclusions.
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF
TRADE AND INDIRECT TAX REFORM IN EL
S ALVAD OR*
During the last decade, El Salvador has undergone a series of policy changes,
resulting from the implementation of structural adjustment reforms. These changes
have affected virtually every aspect of its economy—from price control and exchange
rate policy, to tax, trade, financial reform, and privatisation. The reforms have
substantially increased the role of market forces and made the economy more open.
As in many other developing countries that have gone through similar policy
reforms, the expectation was that structural adjustment would foster growth (e.g.
Corbo et al., 1987). In fact, the growth performance of the Salvadorean economy
during the 1990s has significantly improved, averaging about 5.3% a year (during
the 1980s GDP contracted by 1.0%). Though few would challenge the view that
policy changes since 1989 have something to do with this improved performance, it
is difficult to establish the contribution of the various reform components. Policy-
makers in El Salvador seem to have identified trade liberalisation as the single most
important reform item and main contributor to recent growth. Accordingly, after
1
2an initial significant liberalisation effort, they have taken additional steps to deepen
trade reform.
Critics of structural adjustment in El Salvador, in turn, have attacked trade
liberalisation on different fronts, but especially on the grounds of its (likely, at least)
negative macroeconomic effects (e.g., increased budget deficit from lower tariff rev-
enue, and increased trade imbalance from higher imports).' Although Salvadorean
policy-makers have taken some measures to counterbalance adverse macroeconomic
effects by increasing indirect taxation and allowing the exchange rate to depreciate,
critics point to the negative distributional effects of these.
In this Chapter, we analyse the welfare, income distribution and macroe-
conomic effects of deepening trade liberalisation in El Salvador. We also examine
the effects of specific measures adopted partly to offset unwanted macroeconomic
effects—such as increased value-added taxation. We use an applied general equilib-
rium model to analyse these policy changes. The model—which has been calibrated
to a 1990 data set—disaggregates economic activity into 15 sectors, and identifies
three separate factors of production (capital, urban labour and rural labour) as well
as two household groups (one deriving income mostly from capital and the other
whose income comes mainly from labour). The lack of more disaggregated data does
not allow us to do a more detailed analysis of distributional issues.
1 They also argue that enhanced growth has resulted mainly from the civil war ending (in 1992)
rather than from economic policy reforms.
3The trade reform numerical simulations we carry out consider alternative
closure rules for both foreign sector and government sector. One set of closure rules
has the purpose of calculating the welfare impact of liberalising trade in a theory-
consistent fashion; whereas the other tries to examine broader effects of this policy
given the specific characteristics (or circumstances) of the Salvadorean economy.
The specific issues this Chapter focuses on are the following. In the area
of trade reform, we examine the effects of different degrees of trade liberalisation,
according to the reform stages established by Salvadorean policy-makers. We first
simulate the effects of moving to a tariff structure with rates between 0 and 15%,
which El Salvador has already adopted. We also analyse the effects of taking this
process further by adopting a two-rate tariff structure of zero and 6% as well those of
a hypothetical movement to complete free trade. On the tax-reform side, we examine
the impact of the 30% increase of the VAT rate that took place in El Salvador in
1995. The latter tries to assess the ability of increased indirect taxation to offset
some adverse macroeconomic effects of trade liberalisation and the distributional
consequences of higher indirect taxes.
The structure of the Chapter is as follows. In Section 1.1 we briefly describe
some aspects of structural adjustment reform in El Salvador. Section 1.2 presents
the structure of the model, while Section 1.3 discusses the nature of the data we
use. Section 1.4 analyses simulation results, and, finally, Section 1.5 summarises and
draws some conclusions.
41.1 Some Aspects of Structural Adjustment Reform in El
Salvador
1.1.1 Trade and Exchange Rate Policy
Like the rest of Central America, ever since the creation of the Central
American Common Market (CACM) in 1960, El Salvador followed a growth strategy
based on industrialization through import substitution, especially of consumer goods.
In terms of trade policy, this strategy was implemented via the imposition of high tariff
rates for consumer goods, on the one hand, and of low import taxes for intermediates
and capital goods, on the other. Tariff protection for import substitutes during this
period was thus characterized by a high average level and dispersion (Table 1). This
was complemented with the existence of export taxes on those goods in which El
Salvador had at the time a strong comparative advantage, such as coffee, cotton and
sugar. With manufacturing exports being also indirectly taxed, the result was a trade
regime penalising all exports.
In 1989, in the context of broader structural adjustment reforms, the strategy
of import substitution was partially abandoned, as the country embarked on more
open trade policies, intending to foster growth mainly through export expansion.
Since then, all import quantitative restrictions and regulations—except those having
to do with security and health considerations—have been eliminated, while tariff rates
have been drastically lowered, especially for consumer goods (Table 1). By 1992, El
5Salvador had adopted a 5-20% tariff structure. Simultaneously, all export taxes have
been scrapped. As a result, both the level of protection and its dispersion have been
significantly reduced, with disprotection for key export goods (such as coffee) almost
disappearing. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 1 show the new pattern of incentives by the
early 90s.
There has been a strong belief by Salvadorean policy-makers that trade re-
form has been an important element in the country's improved economic performance
during the 90s. Accordingly, there has been a great deal of enthusiasm for further
deepening trade liberalisation. In 1995, the Salvadorean government announced that
they were aiming at moving to a zero tariff for intermediate and capital goods, and a
6% tariff for consumer goods, by 1998. Though trade reform has proceeded at a slower
pace than this—especially at the top of the tariff structure—, significant changes have
taken place. El Salvador has nowadays a tariff range of 0-15%, a dramatic change in
relation to the end of the 80s. The expectation is that trade reform will significantly
boost economic growth mainly through export expansion (MIPLAN, 1989).
El Salvador's initial trade reforms and new trade liberalisation plans have
been accompanied by changes in its exchange rate regime. First, in 1989-90, multiple
exchange rates were completely abolished, though the exchange rate continued to be
fixed by the government. Then, in 1990, El Salvador abandoned its fixed exchange
rate regime in favour of one of managed floatation—under which the Central Bank
tried basically to avoid an overvaluation of the domestic currency. This because there
6Table 1. El Salvador: Nominal and Effective Tariff Protection
Percentages
Nominal	 Nominal	 Effective	 Effective
Protection Protection Protection Protection
1987 1993 1987 1993
Coffee - 25.0 0.0 - 28.1 -1.3
Cotton 0.0 5.0 - 11.1 4.0
Other agriculture and mining 4.8 7.3 - 2.6 7.0
Processed food 50.4 13.4 199.1 30.4
Beverages and tobacco 225.7 16.8 1409.0 21.2
Textiles 54.2 13.0 121.7 20.4
Apparel, leather and footwear 86.6 26.7 225.6 18.2
Wood and furniture 124.8 13.5 371.1 18.6
Paper and printing 52.8 4.9 105.1 2.4
Chemical prod. 14.3 5.7 7.1 4.6
Rubber, plastic and minerals 37.6 9.3 69.7 6.1
Iron and steel industry 17.6 8.6 17.3 9.3
Machinery and equipment 29.0 9.3 56.6 10.3
Sources: World Bank (1989) for 1987, and Abrego (1994) for 1993.
7was some pressure for the currency to rise against the dollar, due to an oversupply
of the latter brought about by remittances and foreign aid. With this, during 1989-
93, the exchange rate experienced a nominal devaluation of approximately 70%. By
1994, however, policy-makers in El Salvador began having second thoughts regarding
its exchange rate regime. These were formally converted into policy action at the
beginning of 1995, when the Salvadorean government announced its plans to move
again to a fixed exchange rate. In the last four years, the nominal exchange rate has
remained basically fixed. As El Salvador's inflation has been above that of its main
trade partners, this has implied a real appreciation of the local currency.
1 . 1 . 2
	 Taxation
Structural adjustment reforms in El Salvador have affected public finances
especially through the revenue side—where a far-reaching tax reform has been imple-
mented. This has comprised eventually all taxes that were in effect when adjustment
reforms were launched in 1989, namely the income tax, property tax, sale tax, and—as
already described—international trade taxes.
Income tax reform has had to do with both personal and company taxation.
Reforms to the personal income tax have led to a new tax code. The main character-
istic of the new income tax is its much lower marginal and average rates, which have
been cut roughly by half. At present, the maximum marginal and average rates are
30% and 25%, respectively. The tax has also been simplified by dramatically reducing
8the number of income brackets, and eliminating a great deal of exemptions, most of
them linked to the import-substitution strategy.
Company taxation, in turn, has also comprised the reduction of marginal
and average rates, though less substantially. A very important change has been the
abandonment of the multiple-rate system in favour of a flat-rate system. Another key
change has been the scrapping of the classical system of corporate taxation—where
profits were double taxed—in favour of one where taxation takes place at company
level only. These reforms have been accompanied by the elimination of the property
tax, which was applied to net assets both at company and personal level.
As to indirect taxation reform, this have comprised the substitution of the
turnover tax by a value-added tax. The VAT has very few formal exemptions, and do
not apply to capital goods sales. Set initially at 10% in 1992, its rate was increased to
13% in June, 1995—partly with the goal of compensating the loss of revenue stemming
from further trade liberalisation—where it still remains.
1.2 The Model
The model that we present is based on that built by Devarajan et al. (1994)
for Cameroon—which is a static, small open economy model. Our version of this
model contains 15 production sectors, 2 consumers, and 3 factors of production (cap-
ital, rural labour and urban labour). The model assumes that goods produced do-
mestically and goods available in the rest of the world are imperfect substitutes for
9each other, both on the import and on the export side. This implies that, for each
good, three different markets are distinguished: the market for imports, the market
for exports and the market for domestic goods sold at home. World prices are as-
sumed to be fixed both for import and export goods. As to the third market, demand
and supply are endogenously determined. It is assumed that the three markets are
perfectly competitive, and that full employment prevails in factor markets.
1.2.1 Supply
In order to model differences between output produced for the domestic and
export market, supply in the model is determined in two stages. In the first stage,
it is assumed that producers maximize profits from producing a composite good. In
the second stage, this composite good is divided between the domestic and export
market, depending on relative prices. This good is assumed to be produced by a
fixed proportion combination of value added and intermediate inputs. Thus, the
production function for the good in question is given by
Z.
Xi = min (C2i ,	 j = 1, 2, ..., 15,
where Xi is gross output, Qi is value added, Zi is intermediate inputs in sector j
and aii denotes the fixed amount of good i required to produce a unit of j. Value
10
added, in turn, is produced by a combination of capital, urban labour, and rural
labour according to a Cobb-Douglas technology
Q j =llFkaiki k = u, r, IC; E aki = 1,	 (1.2)
where Fkj represents the quantity of factor k used by the jth sector, and aki is the
share of factor k's income in total valued added in sector j.
As to intermediate inputs, they are also required in fixed proportion
Profit maximization subject to (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) leads to the following
factor demand function
Pvi ak j X j 
Fk3 =
	
	
(1.4)
Wk7Pki
where Pi,3 is the price of value added, wk is the average factor price, and 1 7bkj is a
parameter taking account of the fact that factor prices differ across sectors (which
Devarajan et al. (1994) interpret as a factor-market-distortion parameter).
The technology that transforms output for domestic market into output for
the export market is described by the following CET function (for convenience, the
elasticity subindex has been omitted)
-K3 = [/(3.7(Eir +	 - /33) AY11;11,
	 (1.5)
where 77 = (1 + € 1 )/€ 1 , c i being the elasticity of transformation. Di and E3 is output
produced for the domestic and export market, respectively, and P i is a distribution
parameter.
11
Cost minimization subject to (1.5) yields the following export supply func-
tion
Ej D3 [( 1 13i)PE:17471
P jPDi
where PEi and 13Dj are export and domestic goods prices, respectively, expressed in
local currency.
1.2.2 Demand
There are three different sources of demand: foreign demand for export
goods, domestic demand for the domestic good, and domestic demand for imports.
Because of our small country assumption, we do not need an elaborate treatment of
foreign demand, and concentrate on the discussion of domestic demand. It is assumed
that imports and domestic goods are imperfect substitutes for each other (Armingtion
assumption). This implies that, for each sector, there is a composite commodity, Cj,
which is a CES aggregation function of imports (/V/j ) and domestically-produced
goods (Dj) (the elasticity index is again omitted):
Cj = [aj /lCa + (1 — aj )Dia ]	 ,	 (1.7)
where aj is a share parameter and o- = 1/(1+€ 2 ), E2 being the elasticity of substitution
between domestic goods and imports.
(1.6)
12
Cost minimization subject to (1.7) yields import demand as a function of
the domestic good price, Ppi , and the imported good price, PA43:
[ aiPpi	 1+6
Mi = D3	 (1.8)(1 - ai)Pm,
As to the components of domestic final demand, household consumption is derived
from the maximization of a Cobb-Douglas utility function subject to each household's
budget constraint, yielding
CHhi =	 Sh)(1 th)/ Pcp	 (1.9)
where [thi is the share of good j in total consumption by household h, Ih is household
income, sh
 is the average propensity to save by household, t h
 is an average income
tax rate, and P 	 the price of composite good j.
Government demand, in turn, is assumed to be exogenously given, and is
made up by the purchase of goods and services, plus transfers to households
GD =ECCG + ETRh ,	 (1.10)
where cki
 is the share of good j in aggregate government consumption of goods and
services, CG, and TRh denotes government transfers to households.
Finally, although this is a static model, we must accommodate for invest-
ment occurring during the period of analysis. Aggregate investment, which is exoge-
nously set equal to aggregate savings, is made up of fixed capital investment, VI , and
inventory investment, V2:
I =	 + V2 .	 (1.11)
13
As to fixed capital formation, we consider only gross investment, as no recent depre-
ciation data is available for El Salvador. Fixed investment by sector of destination
and origin is given by the following expressions, respectively
PjK=mV1, (1.12)
K; =EbiiK	 (1.13)
where Pi is the price of a unit of capital installed in sector j, K.di is fixed investment
in sector j, mi
 denotes the proportion of aggregate fixed investment done by sector
j, K; is fixed investment by sector of origin, while b ii represents the share of capital
good j in fixed investment in sector i.
Finally, inventory investment is specified as a fixed proportion of gross out-
put
v2 = E 63X3 Psi ,	 (1.14)
3
where Si is the ratio of the value of inventory investment to gross output in sector j,
and Ps, is the price of gross output.
1.2.3 Prices
As indicated earlier, the model incorporates the small open economy as-
sumption and thus considers world prices for imports and exports to be exogenous
for all goods. Domestic import and export prices are, respectively, given by
Pmi = RP1,1j (1 + tm; ),	 (1.15)
14
PEj = RP.,	 (1.16)
where Pmf
 . and 3 denote the world price of imports and exports, respectively, R is3
the exchange rate, and tmi
 is the tariff rate applied to good j.
Prices for composite good, C, and gross output, X i , are given by
PC, = (PD3 D3 + PAI,M3)1C3,	 (1.17)
Pxj (PD-DJ PEJ E Al X j.	 (1.18)
The valued-added price is, in turn, the price of sectoral output net of intermediate
inputs and indirect taxes:
Pt); = P 3 (1 — txi ) —	 (1.19)
where tx, represent either an excise tax—applied to alcoholic drinks and
tobacco, and which we model as a production tax—or a production subsidy—granted
to some agricultural activities and utilities.
The price per unit of capital, Pi , is given by
Pj = EP„bij .	 (1.20)
Finally, we will use the producer price index as our aggregate price index, P:
P = E 03Xy,	 (1.21)
3
where Oi
 is the proportion of total output accounted for by sector j.
15
1.2.4 Income
Factor incomes are made up of domestically-generated income, Yk, and in-
come from abroad, Fk, i.e.
Yk = E WkiPjFkj RFk•	 (1.22)
3
We distinguish two types of households according to their income composi-
tion between labour income and capital income. We label these labour and capitalist
households, respectively. Here, we also consider separately the existence of remit-
tances as well as government transfers. Mapping the distribution of factor income
into the distribution of income between the two households, and adding remittances
and government transfers, we get
= E AkhYk RNh T Rh)	 (1.23)
where /h denotes household income Akh represents the share of factor k's income
going to household h, and Nh and TRh are remittances from abroad and government
transfers, respectively.
Government derives its revenue, GR, from taxes, transfers from abroad and
other non-tax revenue (such as revenue from domestic transfers, services provided by
the government, etc.):
GR = E Ihth +t„L + E RPL.Mitm. + E Pwi Xi — E pc, aiiXi tvi
3	 3
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+Etx,13xi Xj —	 + NTR,	 (1.24)
where t„ is an average corporate tax rate, L is corporate income, t vi is the value-
added tax rate, and NTR represents non-tax revenue. (The second last term in
(1.24) takes account of the fact the capital goods are exempt from the value-added
tax). Corporate income is, in turn, given by
L = -y	 w,c0i	,	 (1.25)
where -y is the fraction of capital income generated by corporations in the economy
as a whole (the subscript K refers to the factor capital).
1.2.5 Market Clearing Conditions
Equilibrium in the goods market implies that supply equals demand for each
commodity, i.e.
Ci = INT; + ECHih+ CC; + 13 .	 (1.26)
In the labour market, full employment of each factor is assumed, so that aggregate
demand for each input type must equal aggregate supply:
E Fki =	 (1.27)
where 11: is the supply of factor k, which is exogenously given.
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1.2.6 Macroeconomic Closure
Regarding closure rules,' the model is savings-driven in that investment
in the period of analysis equals aggregate savings—which is the sum of households
savings (SP ), government savings (S9 ) and foreign savings (S1):
INV = SP + S9 + RSf ,	 ( 1.28)
The first two components of the right hand side of (1.28) are defined as
SP = Esh (1 — th )Y Hh ,	 (1.29)
S9 = GR— GD,	 (1.30)
while the third component is determined from the identity for the balance of payments
current account:
E PI Mi	Ykf = EP1Ej +ENh +TRF + Sf	 (1.31)
We use different closure rules involving the three savings types,' depending on the
particular issue we are interested in. Closure rules differ when we simulate the impact
of trade liberalisation. Here, in order to isolate the welfare effect of trade reform, we
keep government revenue constant and endogenise one tax rate (the corporate tax
rate); as to the foreign sector, we fix foreign savings and allow the exchange rate to
2 0n the general issue of closure rules in applied general equilibrium models see Dewatripont and
Michel (1987).
3 0n foreign sector closure rules, see Whalley and Yeung (1984); de Melo and Robinson (1989);
Devarajan et al. (1994).
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vary; 4 while to keep private savings constant, we endogenise the household savings
rate, hs h . Government expenditure, in turn, is always fixed as well as international
transfers and factor income from abroad.
Although this closure rule is very useful from an analytical standpoint, it
does not necessarily reflects the situation of the Salvadorean economy in the last
few years. On the external sector, the relevant feature of this economy is its ability
to finance an increasing trade deficit through aid, capital inflows and, especially,
remittances. To capture this, in our second trade liberalisation simulation, foreign
savings are endogenously determined. Since transfers and factor income from abroad
are fixed, the endogenisation of foreign savings is equivalent to keeping the trade
balance free. On the other hand, we keep the exchange rate fixed, reflecting the plan
of pegging that variable announced by the Salvadorean government in February, 1995.
Similarly, we endogenise both government revenue and private savings—which implies
that household savings rates and the corporate tax rate are now exogenous. For the
model to be exactly determined, one more variable must be determined exogenously.
Our choice is to make aggregate fixed-capital investment exogenous.
1.3 Data and Model Calibration
The social accounting matrix (SAM) that feeds the model is based mainly
on data from the Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador (1993) (Henceforth BCR,
4 An external sector closure rule similar to this is also used in Devarajan et al. (1994).
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1993) and Ministerio de Planificacion de El Salvador (1991) and (1994) (Henceforth
MIPLAN, 1991 and 1994, respectively). In BCR (1993), a new system of national
accounts for El Salvador has been built. This system, set up for the year 1990, contains
an input-output table, together with income and expenditure accounts for households,
corporations (both private and public), government and the rest of the world. In
fact, it amounts to a SAM with a rather different format. We combine this data
with information from household consumption expenditure and employment surveys
done by MIPLAN (1991) and MIPLAN (1994) as well as with some macroeconomic
accounts. With the necessary adjustments, this data readily produce a SAM with the
disaggregation and consistency required by our model.
The input-output table contained in BCR (1993) is a 1990 updated version
of the 1978 table, and classifies economic activity into 44 sectors. The updating was
performed by a combination of survey data and RAS. We have aggregated this table
into 15 sectors, trying to keep separately key sectors in agriculture and manufacturing
in the Salvadorean economy.
As to income and expenditure by different institutional sectors, since the
aggregation presented in BCR (1993) is not always the same as required for our SAM
(some transactions in BCR are too aggregated and others present a very different dis-
aggregation), we have complemented their data with information from consumption
and employment surveys done by MIPLAN (1991 and 1994). This has been the case
for household consumption and income as well as for the distribution of remunera-
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tions by sector between rural and urban labour. The consumption survey done by
MIPLAN is for 1990-91, while the employment survey is for 1992-93. The obvious
result is that BCR and MIPLAN magnitudes do not match. Therefore, in order to
maintain SAM balances, we have used MIPLAN's data to compute shares only and
have kept the corresponding aggregate magnitudes provided by BCR.
When the foregoing data combination has not been sufficient, we have com-
plemented it with balance of payments and government finance accounts. This has
been done especially with regard to transfers among institutional sectors as well as
government non-tax revenue. When appropriate, we have again followed the proce-
dure of using the complementary information to compute shares only, while preserving
the original aggregates.
As to other data required for our model, such as sectoral capital stocks,
trade elasticities and other parameters, they have been obtained as follows. In the
absence of adequate data, capital stocks have been computed by assuming a uniform
return to capital of 20%. This is a procedure that has also been used in some of
the applied public finance literature (e.g. Ballard et al., 1985). On the other hand,
lacking a capital composition matrix, we used the associated vector, which gives the
share of each capital good in aggregate investment demand.
The elasticity values we use for the Armington and CET functions are based
on (guess) values used by Hinojosa-Ojeda et al. (1994) for a group of Central Amer-
ican countries. As Devarajan et al. (1994), we have also followed their practice of
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Table 2. El Salvador: Benchmark Selected Model Parameters
Import Export Trade Import Value-
Coffee
share,
a
0.000
share,
i3
0.392
Elast,
€
1 = 62
6.0
Tariff,
tm*
0.000
added
tax, ti,
0.087
Cereals 0.309 0.950 2.2 0.003 0.000
Fruits and vegetables 0.223 0.786 1.9 0.051 0.000
Other primary 0.332 0.841 1.9 0.003 0.025
Processed food 0.271 0.836 1.8 0.047 0.052
Sugar 0.115 0.620 3.0 0.101 0.025
Beverage and tobacco 0.131 0.871 1.7 0.138 0.058
Textiles 0.247 0.731 1.2 0.128 0.034
Apparel 0.099 0.784 1.2 0.167 0.047
Leather and its prod. 0.092 0.907 0.9 0.080 0.026
Paper and printing 0.430 0.663 1.7 0.054 0.050
Chemical prod. 0.498 0.760 1.5 0.069 0.010
Other manuf. 0.371 0.978 0.6 0.086 0.025
Construction 0.000 0.000 n.a. n.a. 0.000
Services 0.172 0.806 1.8 n.a. 0.010
* Ratio of tariff revenue to imports. Tariffs in this column are lower than those presented
in Table 1 because they take into account the existence of both exemptions and free trade
within the CACM.
n.a.: not applicable.
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using, for a given sector, the same values for Armington and CET functions. They also
assign larger elasticity values to agricultural goods, trying to reflect the higher degree
of homogeneity between agricultural goods abroad and their counterparts consumed
domestically. We adopt this practice as well. On the production and preferences
sides, we use Cobb-Douglas functional forms.
Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992) and Shiells and Reinert (1993) have esti-
mated Armington elasticities for manufacturing activities using data for the United
States. They produce estimates which are generally lower than those we use here.'
Though their sectors and ours do not exactly match, their estimates are smaller on
average by about one third than those presented in Table 2 for manufacturing activ-
ities. For some of our sectors—leather and other manufacturing—the estimates they
present are larger than our values. As part of our trade liberalisation simulations, we
do sensitivity analyses on the trade elasticity values, and find that using the US esti-
mates for manufacturing activities has only a minor effect on welfare and aggregate
income results.
Finally, shift and share parameters have been obtained through the conven-
tional calibration procedures used in applied general equilibrium modelling. These
consist of using the exogenous elasticity estimates to determine values for other pa-
rameters in the model, so that the benchmark year constitutes an equilibrium (e.g.
Mansur and Whalley, 1984; Shoven and Whalley, 1994). Table 2 presents the parame-
5 We became aware of the existence of these estimates only after this Chapter had been written.
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ters we use for the Armington and CET functions as well some additional information
for the benchmark year.
1.4 Simulation Results
1.4.1 Trade Liberalisation
In this section we describe simulation results from the following scenarios of
trade liberalisation:
1. Reducing the maximum tariff for consumer goods from 20% to 15% and the
minimum duty for intermediate and capital goods from 5% to zero. This cor-
responds to the tariff changes implemented between 1995 and 1998.
2. Setting a single tariff of 6% for consumer goods and a zero-tariff for intermedi-
ate and capital goods. This corresponds to the longer-term trade-reform plan
announced by the Salvadorean government in February, 1995.
3. Completely eliminating all import tariffs.
We have performed these simulations using the two closure rules described
above.
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Trade Liberalisation with Fixed Foreign Savings and Fixed
Government Revenue
In order to isolate the impact of trade liberalisation on welfare, we fix foreign
and private savings as well as government revenue (equal-revenue yield) for the three
trade liberalisation scenarios considered. The counterpart of fixing government rev-
enue and private savings is the endogenisation of the corporate income tax rate and
labour houselods' propensity to save. Finally, with fixed foreign savings, the exchange
rate has been allowed to vary (the producer price index being the new numeraire).
Table 3. El Salvador: Welfare and GDP Impact of Alternative Tariff Changes
0-15% Tariff	 0-6% Tariff
Structure	 Structure
Free
Trade
Equivalent variation
as a % of income
All households* 0.25 0.34 0.39
Labour households 1.47 1.85 2.02
Cap. households
-1.61 -1.59 -1.68
Change in GDP (%) 0.16 0.19 0.21
* As a% of GDP.
Welfare and Income Level
The movement from a tariff structure of 5-20% towards a 0-15% structure
would seem to imply a greater dispersion of protection. However, partly because of
the lower average protection level, our simulation results show that this will still have
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a positive impact on aggregate welfare (Table 3). Once this movement has been made,
the welfare gains from moving towards complete free trade are very modest (welfare
rises by 0.14% of GDP). Moving from the current tariff structure towards that aimed
at by the Salvadorean government (of 0-6%) would mean a welfare increase of only
0.09%. The trade liberalisation impact on GDP follows a very similar pattern. These
results suggest that the efficiency gains of reducing tariff protection fall exponentially
once a relatively low tariff level has been achieved, a result consistent with other
findings in the literature (see, e.g. Whalley and Srinivassan, 1986).
We have performed sensitivity analysis on the trade elasticity values, using
estimates based on those produced by Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992) for manufac-
turing activities, while leaving those for primary goods unaltered. In this new set of
simulations, we also move downwards the elasticity for services by about 50%. Us-
ing these new set of values changes welfare and GDP results very little indeed (they
generally change up to the third digit after the decimal point, and by roughly one
point for each scenario of trade liberalisation). Since we are in a second-best world
(there are factor market distortions and non-optimal taxes and subsidies), it is not
straightforward to determine the reasons for this insensitivity. However, the fact that
not all estimates by Reinert and Roland-Holst are smaller than our central case values
is probably of some significance.
26
Table 4. El Salvador: Distribution Effects of Full Tariff Elimination
Percentages of aggregate factor and household income
Benchmark New Equilibrium
Factor income
Rural labour 11.83 12.05
Urban labour 21.44 21.32
Capital 66.73 66.63
Household income
Labour households 41.97 42.82
Cap. households 58.03 57.18
Income Distribution
Welfare results in Table 3 also show that only labour households benefit from
trade liberalisation—a reflection of changes in income distribution are adverse to cap-
italist households. However, for our model disaggregation at least, the distributional
impact of reducing tariffs is quite modest for all scenarios of trade liberalisation. Ab-
solute returns increase for all factors under the three scenarios of trade liberalisation
considered, with rural labour being the main winner and urban labour the main rel-
ative loser—as shown by Table 4 for the full-tariff elimination scenario. The overall
return to labour relative to that of capital also increases slightly in all cases.
This pattern of changes in factor returns is closely related to that of move-
ments in output and employment across sectors. In the case of rural labour, the rise
in its return is the result of output expansion in agriculture, which is an intensive user
of that input; while the behaviour of the return to urban labour is explained mainly
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by the contraction of manufacturing and construction and services, its main users.
The decline of these sectors is also responsible for the fall in the return to capital
relative to the aggregate wage rate.
These factor return movements seem to be consistent with traditional trade
theory predictions, such as those made by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (e.g. Jones
and Neary, 1984). In effect, it is the factor used intensively in the sector whose relative
price went down—manufacturing—the one that ends up losing. However, there are
not absolute losers here.
As to household income, in line with the foregoing, the winners are labour
households (Table 4). Thus, at an aggregate level, trade liberalisation has a small
but progressive impact on income distribution. At a more specific level, this seems
to be still the case since rural labour wins, and rural households in El Salvador are
poorer than their urban counterparts (Gregory, 1992).
Macroeconomic Aggregates
The foregoing results indicate that the efficiency and distributional impact
of trade liberalisation would be positive. The same cannot be said about its macroe-
conomic effects (Table 5). On the one hand, government savings would tend to fall.
In our model, this does not show up since by fixing government revenue we have
fixed also its savings. However, given that revenue from personal income and indirect
taxes exclusive of tariffs decline, corporate tax revenue must more than double (in all
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cases), in order to keep total revenue constant. Clearly, such a change in corporate
taxes would be infeasible in practice.
Table 5. El Salvador: Selected Macroeconomic Effects of Trade Liberalisation
Percentage changes with respect to benchmark
0-15%
Structure
0-6%
Structure
Free
Trade
Private savings -4.07 -4.49 -4.81
Corporate tax revenue 108.99 118.91 126.12
Personal income tax revenue -2.16 -2.39 -2.56
VAT revenue -0.70 -0.77 -0.81
Tariff revenue -85.84 -94.05 -100.00
Other tax revenue -0.40 -0.56 -0.68
We should highlight two results here. First, despite the GDP expansion, rev-
enue from the personal income tax falls. This is due to the changes that have taken
place in income distribution, which has lowered income for capitalist households—El
Salvador's main tax payers. Second, even though absorption has remained roughly
constant, indirect tax revenue exclusive of tariffs declines. This comes from the con-
traction of manufacturing and services, the main sources of this type of revenue in El
Salvador.
On the other hand, aggregate private savings also decline, resulting again
from changes in income distribution. With both foreign and public savings being held
constant aggregate savings fall, and so does investment.
29
As to export expansion—the main channel through which El Salvador's
policy-makers expect trade liberalisation to foster growth–, the effect of lower tar-
iffs on it is indeed modest, ranging between 3.8% and 5.1%, depending on the extent
of trade liberalisation.
Trade Liberalisation with Endogenous Foreign Savings and
Government Revenue
As indicated above, over the last eight years, El Salvador has been able to
finance an increasing trade deficit through a combination of foreign aid, capital inflows
and family remittances. In fact, the plan for further deepening trade liberalisation
that was announced by the Salvadorean government in February, 1995, could hardly
have been made without the expectation that this flow of foreign resources—especially
remittances—will be present, at least in the near future.
In this context, it is also interesting to examine the effects of further liberal-
izing trade once foreign savings—or the trade balance—are allowed to freely vary. We
have simulated this scenario under the restriction that both fixed capital investment
and the exchange rate stays constant. The latter is consistent with the policy of
pegging the exchange rate that has been in effect in El Salvador since the beginning
of 1995; the former is required for the model to be exactly determined, although—in
principle–we could have chosen to fix a different variable. On the other hand, we must
now endogenise government revenue; with government expenditure continuing to be
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fixed, the variable that equilibrates its budget is savings. Again, we have performed
simulations for the three trade liberalisation scenarios identified above. Aggregate
results are shown in Table 6.
Note that the expansion in GDP is now lower under all scenarios of trade
liberalisation. This seems to be the result of smaller exports resulting from the
exchange rate not having experienced a depreciation. The pattern of changes in
production is also somewhat different. Under the movement toward a 0-15% tariff
structure, agricultural GDP contracts while all other major sectors expand. This
means that sectoral results are being dominated by the capital inflow that is generated
in order to keep real investment constant. This inflow is quite high, implying an
increase in the trade deficit of more than 10.7%. Note that exports even contract
under the first scenario of trade liberalisation (0-15% structure).
On the other hand, now that government revenue has been allowed to vary, as
expected, tariff removal has a negative impact on public savings. Though rather large,
this is slightly lower than the fall in tariff revenue due to the increase experienced
by receipts from both direct and other indirect taxes. The increase in indirect tax
revenue is influenced by the rise in absorption brought about by trade liberalisation.
Greater direct tax revenue, in turn, is basically the result of the change in income
distribution, which now favour capitalists. Aggregate savings does fall, but somewhat
modestly (around 2.4%), since foreign savings has substantially gone up, and income
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Table 6. El Salvador: Trade Liberalisation Effects with Endogenous Foreign Savings
Percentage changes with respect to benchmark
0-15%
Structure
0-6%
Structure
Free
Trade
Income and trade
GDP 0.10 0.13 0.15
Exports -0.18 0.08 0.27
Imports 3.61 4.27 4.74
Trade deficit 8.83 9.95 10.77
Public finances
Government revenue -15.50 -16.99 -18.07
Personal income tax rev. 0.68 0.68 0.67
Corporate tax revenue 0.65 0.65 0.64
VAT revenue 0.08 0.070 0.07
Other tax revenue 0.08 -0.09 -0.20
Government savings -1273 -1393 -1479
Other Savings
Private savings 0.82 0.80 0.79
Foreign savings 20.08 31.64 34.24
Factor prices
Rural labour return (1) 0.58 0.65 0.70
Urban labour return (2) 0.68 0.66 0.65
Capital return (3) 0.65 0.67 0.64
(1)/(3) -0.07 0.00 0.05
(2)/(3) 0.03 0.02 0.003
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distribution changes have allowed private savings to increase. The second movement
is, however, quite modest, so that national savings experience a large contraction.
Now, if investment is to remain unchanged, there must be a replacement of
national by foreign savings, as shown by Table 6. However, boosting public savings
by rising taxes on sales, for instance, may contribute to avoid this, as we will see now.
1.4.2 Increased Value-Added Taxation
We have simulated the effects of the increase in the value-added tax rate
from 10% to 13%, which took place in June, 1995. Results are presented in Table
7. Again, in order to take account of El Salvador's circumstances, we have kept the
exchange fixed and allow foreign savings to vary. Since not all goods are subject to
the VAT, uniformly rising its rate in all sectors being taxed has an impact not only
on the general price level but also on relative prices.
Relative price changes, in turn, lead to movements both in the level and
structure of output. Now, given that we are in a second-best world, G GDP ends up
rising, though very slightly. This comes especially from the expansion agricultural
activities, where most goods exempt from value-added taxation are. Manufacturing
and services both contract in aggregate.
6 0n the welfare implications of policy changes in the presence of more than one domestic disto-
rion, see, e.g. Bhagwati (1981); Lancaster and Lipsey (1996). For an applied general equilibrium
perspective, see, e.g. Clarete and Whalley (1988).
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Table 7. El Salvador: Macroeconomic and Distribution Effects of Increasing VAT
Percentage changes with respect to benchmark
% Change
Macro aggregates
GDP 0.03
Trade balance -4.68
Tax revenue 7.02
Government savings 581.83
Private savings -0.72
Foreign savings -14.88
Income distribution
Rural labour income share* 0.93
Urban labour income share* -0.28
Capital income share* -0.07
Labour households income share** 0.17
Cap. households income share** -0.12
Rural labour return (1) 0.48
Urban labour return (2) -0.68
Capital return (3) -0.48
(1)/(3) 0.67
(2)/(3) -0.19
* Share in GDP
** Share in household income
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These movements in production have an impact on factor prices and income
distribution. On the one hand, the expansion of agriculture causes the return to
rural labour—an input used intensively there—to rise slightly, while the contraction
of manufacturing and services—both intensive users of urban labour—leads to a fall
in the urban wage rate. The return to capital also decreases, following the decline of
manufacturing, its main user. Thus, factor income distribution changes in favour of
rural labour. Though the ratio of the urban wage rate to the return to capital falls
slightly, the increase in the rural wage rate is big enough to make labour as a whole
a winner vis-a-vis capital. This is also reflected in terms of household income dis-
tribution, with labour households increasing their share, though very slightly (Table
7).
As to the trade balance, the increase in the VAT leads to a small rise of
exports and a contraction of imports, improving the balance of trade —and current
account (Table 7). However, rising the VAT rate to 13% does not fully compensate for
the trade balance deterioration induced by moving to a 0-15% tariff structure. With
a fixed nominal exchange rate, a full compensation would require rising the VAT by
approximately 40.3% on average.
On the government finance side, tax revenue goes up by more than 7%,
which —with expenditure being fixed—substantially rises government savings (Table
7). This is, of course, basically a direct result of the VAT increase. Direct tax
revenue goes down due to the fall in capital income (the increase of labour income,
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which pay much less taxes, is not enough to offset this). Tariff revenue, in turn,
falls as imports decline, while revenue from excise taxes goes down as a result of the
fall in manufacturing output. Due to the contraction of manufacturing and a fall in
consumption, the percentage increase in VAT revenue is below the increase in its rate.
The VAT rate increase from 10% to 13% would not be enough to fully
compensate for the fall in revenue that would result from moving to a 0-15% tariff
structure. According to our simulations, with flexible foreign savings and fixed ex-
change rate, to fully offset this, the required rise in the VAT rate would be of 40.4%
on average (very similar to the increase needed to keep the current account balance
unchanged). For complete liberalisation, the corresponding VAT increase would be
of roughly 75%.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
This Chapter has used an applied general equilibrium model to analyse the
welfare, distribution and macroeconomic effects of trade liberalisation in El Salvador
as well as the effects from increased value-added taxation. We find that further
unilateral trade liberalisation in this country produces quite small gains in terms of
GDP and welfare. This is due to some extent to the fact that tariff rates are already
relatively low and there is no much dispersion in the tariff structure. 7 Contrary to
7 In our model we have considered perfectly competitive markets only. Taking account of imperfect
competition and scale economies may rise the gains from trade liberalization as has occurred in other
simulation exercises See, e.g. Devarajan and Rodrik, 1991; 1992 Harris, 1995.
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the expectations of Salvadorean policy-makers in recent years, the export impact of
trade liberalisation appears to be also modest. Thus, it would seem difficult to argue
that trade liberalisation alone will turn exports into the engine of growth for the
Salvadorean economy.
On the other hand, and contrary to the views of critics of structural reform
in El Salvador, we find that the higher income level that trade liberalisation leads to
will be more progressively distributed; this both in terms of factors and households,
at least for the level of disaggregation in our model. This is basically in line with the
predictions of traditional trade theory.
The macroeconomic impact of trade liberalisation seems to be negative.
National savings—and even aggregate savings—tend to decrease, which do not favour
long-run growth. Thus, trade reform would tend to favour consumption over capital
accumulation, unless other measures are adopted. On the other hand, the fall in
government savings may threaten fiscal stability. Trade liberalisation would also lead
to a significant deterioration of the balance of trade—a consequence of a sharp rise
in imports and a modest export expansion.
If not coupled by capital inflows, an increasing trade deficit may lead to a loss
of international reserves and threaten balance of payments stability. In El Salvador,
remittances, foreign aid and a return of private capital that had fled the country
during the 1980s civil war have avoided this in recent years. Another alternative
would lie in adopting certain domestic policies. Here complementary, fiscal measures,
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for example, may also come into play. Our simulations also show that the increase
in the VAT rate that took place in mid 1995—partly intended to offset the loss of
tariff revenue from trade liberalisation—will have a positive and significant impact on
government finance and the balance of trade. This substantially offsets the negative
macroeconomic effects of trade liberalisation.
On the other hand, raising the VAT rate may have less negative effects than
often thought. In particular, output does not contract, and income distribution even
seems to improve, though very slightly. This suggests that many of the presumed
negative effects of higher value-added taxation in El Salvador—such as a worsened
income distribution—, may come in fact from factors certainly related to the tax
measure, but different from it (such as expectations, speculation, etc. and their effect
on prices). On the other hand, we must bear in mind that our model yields 'long-run'
results (i.e., once the economy has reached a new equilibrium); short-run effects may
well be very different.
Turning again to the benefits of deepening trade reform, if one compares
income gains to El Salvador from completely removing all tariffs (0.21% of GDP)
with those from taxing current foreign direct investment, it turns out that the latter,
though, also low, are much bigger (0.76% of GDP). This despite the fact that FDI in
El Salvador can be considered to be quite low by Latin American standards, and its
income is lightly taxed (a single rate of 20% is applied to foreign capital income)—at
least by developed country standards.
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This comparison indicates that attracting FDI—and taxing its income—
may contribute to rising national income levels, perhaps as much as further trade
liberalisation. If we bear in mind that trade liberalisation reduces the relative return
to capital, the comparison might also suggest that trade reform could even be welfare-
reducing—if it were to lead to an outflow of FDI and therefore loss of tax revenue
and national income that offsets gains from improved resource allocation. In the next
Chapter we explore this possibility using a modified version of the model employed
in this Chapter to incorporate FDI flows and international capital income taxation.
Due to data constraints on sectoral FDI flows, we calibrate the model to data for the
economy of Costa Rica.
CHAPTER 2
TRADE LIBERALISATION IN THE PRESENCE
OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND TAX
CREDITS
A well-known result from the "tariff-jumping" investment literature of the
1970s is that import-tariff-induced capital inflows will be immiserising for a small
open economy (e.g. Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro, 1977). It is also well-known that
this result relies crucially on the assumption that the host economy does not tax
foreign capital (Bhagwati, 1973). As Bond (1991) has shown, if this assumption is
lifted and taxes paid in the host country by foreign companies are credited in the
source country against the corresponding domestic tax liability, tariff-induced capital
inflows are no longer immiserising. Therefore, it will be optimal for a small open
economy to impose a tariff on its imports—provided that the importable sector uses
capital intensively.
The possibility of import tariffs being welfare-enhancing for a small economy
may have some interesting policy implications for many developing countries which
have embarked on outward-oriented growth strategies in the last fifteen years or so.
First, unilateral trade liberalisation and foreign direct investment figure prominently
in most LDCs' "new" growth strategies. Second, in many developing countries trade
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liberalisation has implied a reduction in tariff protection for the manufacturing sector,
which tends to be relatively capital-intensive. This, as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
suggests, will tend to reduce the return to capital and thereby FDI inflows to these
countries.' Third, the bulk of FDI in developing countries originates in developed
countries, the majority of which uses the tax credit mechanism when taxing foreign-
source income.2
In this context, unilateral trade liberalisation could deteriorate national wel-
fare. Whether it does or not is an empirical question—which would depend on the
relative strength of the positive effect of lower distortions resulting from freer trade,
and the negative effect associated with the loss of tax revenue following lower FDI
inflows. Incidentally, this possibility of welfare-reducing trade liberalisation could
provide an explanation to some of the opposition that reforms seeking freer trade
have faced in developing countries. In effect, this could be the case of the opposition
by groups that would not necessarily or directly lose from the changes in relative
prices and the relocation effects associated with trade liberalisation.
Although a lot of work has been devoted to the theoretical link between
import tariffs and international capital flows (see e.g. Wong, 1996), model-based
'This would be more likely to occur in countries with relatively large domestic markets in which
foreign companies have located to bypass an import tariff and serve the internal market.
2 As of 1991, 15 out of 24 OECD countries offered their companies credits for taxes paid in
countries with which a treaty to avoid double taxation was not in effect (see OECD, 1991). Since
for capital-exporter countries a system of deductions is welfare-superior to full credits (Musgrave,
1969), this preference for the crediting system among developed countries is hard to explain. This is
the case especially when capital flows are fundamentally unidirectional, as those between developed
and developing countries. Scharf (1997) has suggested and analytically explored the idea that home
countries prefer tax credits because they want to discourage international tax evasion.
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empirical work endogenously linking capital flows to tariff changes in a general equi-
librium setting—whether with foreign capital taxation or not— is quite scant. In
fact, the only calibrated study that appears to have addressed this linkage is Goulder
and Eichengreen (1992). 3 However, they focused exclusively on portfolio investment,
without considering FDI. They also do not consider international capital income tax-
ation.
This Chapter quantifies the welfare impact of unilateral trade liberalisation
once its effect on FDI flows is taken into account and taxation of FDI is allowed
for. For this, a multi-sector applied general equilibrium model integrating trade,
capital flows and international capital income taxation is used. The model has been
calibrated to a 1990-91 data set for the economies of Costa Rica and a group of OECD
countries (those using the credit mechanism when taxing foreign-source income). We
show that, with foreign capital taxation and the foreign-tax-credit system in force,
free trade is no longer first-best for a small country such as Costa Rica, and that
trade liberalisation may be harmful to it. We find that the optimal tariff structure
for the Costa Rican economy would consist of a combination of relatively low import
tariffs and subsidies.
3 Some applied general equilibrium models seeking to quantify the effects of the North American
Free Agreement (NAFTA) explored the likely impact of incorporating FDI flows, but did so in an
ad-hoc, exogenous fashion. See Brown (1992); Francois and Shiells (1994). Damus et al. (1991) have
studied the implications of the existence of tax credits for Canada but in a corporate tax reform
context.
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The Chapter is organised as follows. The next Section discusses the relation-
ship between import tariffs, capital flows and welfare with and without tax credits.
Section 2.2 describes recent trade liberalisation and FDI policy in Costa Rica. Section
2.3 describes the model used in our numerical simulations. Section 2.4 discusses the
nature of the data used for the empirical implementation of the model. Section 2.5
analyses simulation results, and Section 2.6 summarises and concludes.
2.1 Tariffs, Capital Flows and Welfare
The relationship between unilateral tariff changes and international capital
movements has been analysed in great detail in the theoretical international trade
literature (see, e.g. Mundell, 1957; Jones, 1967; Wong, 1995). The dominant ap-
proach considers trade and capital movements to be substitutes for each other.' This
approach is based on the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model, in which countries differ
in terms of factor endowments. As is well-known, in this model free trade leads to
the equalisation of factor prices, which eliminates the rationale for factor movements.
Hence free trade is a perfect substitute for factor movements. On the other hand, if
factors move from where they are abundant to where they are scarce, the bases for
trade are reduced, or disappear. Hence factor movements are a substitute for trade
(Ruffin, 1984).
4 Schmitz and Helmberger (1970), Markusen (1983), and \\Tong
 (1986) have presented models in
which trade and capital flows are complements.
43
The interaction between tariff changes and capital movements was first for-
mally presented by Mundell (1957). In a two-sector, two-factor model, invoking the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, Mundell shows that when a tariff is imposed by the
labour-abundant country the return to capital is increased, and capital moves there;
with perfect capital mobility, trade eventually disappears. This type of analysis later
gave rise to the literature on "tariff-jumping" investment and its welfare consequences
for a small open economy. The main conclusion of this literature was that the com-
bination of capital inflows and distortionary tariff barriers in a small economy would
result in immiserising growth. The idea had been suggested in Johnson (1967) and
Bhagwati (1973), and was further developed by Minabe (1974), and Brecher and
Diaz-Alejandro (1977) in a two-good, two-factor framework. It was generalised by
Jones (1984), and especially by Neary and Ruane (1988). The second two authors
lifted the restriction on the number of goods and factors, and extended the main
result to the case in which capital inflows are entirely endogenous.
In all these models, however, the result of distortionary tariff changes leading
to immiserising capital inflows relies crucially on foreign capital not being taxed by the
host country. Bond (1991) presents a small open economy, general equilibrium model
with foreign capital taxation and two (traded) goods, with the importable good being
capital intensive. He uses a Heckscher-Ohlin structure both on the goods and capital
side, i.e. he assummes that domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes as are
domestic and foreign capital. Bond shows that if the foreign tax credit mechanism
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is present in foreign investors' home country, the optimal import tariff for a small,
host economy is positive. As is well-known, under the foreign-tax-credit system,
income taxes paid by companies operating abroad are fully credited against their
home country tax liability—as long as their amount does not exceed such liability. In
such a case, by taxing foreign capital income, host countries extract a gain in terms
of tax revenue that would otherwise be captured by the home country.
As Bond indicates, by bringing with it tax revenue, foreign capital generates
a kind of (positive) fiscal externality in the host country. The argument, as presented
by Bond, runs as follows. For the host to capture all of the tax revenue associated
with foreign capital income, its tax rate must be set at a level equal to that in the
capital-exporting country. This, however, gives rise to a divergence between private
and social cost of capital, i.e. the gross and the net rate of return, respectively. The
latter is indeed the return required by foreign capitalists, which in equilibrium must
be the same in the host and home country. Therefore, the optimal policy for the host
consists of subsidising foreign capital at a rate equal to the income tax rate. As Bond
(p. 321) puts it, "essentially, the home country wants to pay the taxes for the owners
of imported capital and to impose no distortions in the goods market."
In practice, however, it might not be feasible for a country to subsidise for-
eign capital in such a direct way. On the other hand, as pointed out by Bond, some
capital-exporting countries (such as the USA) do not grant credits for taxes that
have actually not been paid. Under these circumstance, it might be easier and more
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effective for a capital-importing country to resort to an indirect form of subsidisa-
tion, such as an import tariff—provided, of course, that foreign capital locates in the
import-competing sector. As the tariff will distort consumption decisions, it will be
an inferior option to the direct subsidy—but still superior to free trade. In Section
6 we compare the performance of the direct subsidy vis-a-vis that of the tariff. The
next section describes recent trade and FDI policy in Costa Rica.
2.2 Recent Trade and Foreign Investment Policy in Costa
Rica
Like El Salvador, Costa Rica is a member of the Central American Common
Market (CACM). This has contributed to both countries sharing similar trade and
industrial policies at least since the creation of the CACM in 1960. Costa Rica also
followed a growth strategy based on industrialisation through import substitution,
supported by a tariff structure very similar to El Salvador's—high tariff rates for
consumer goods, on the one hand, and of low import taxes for intermediates and
capital goods, on the other. Costa Rica's trade regime was biased against exports
some of which— such as coffee and bananas, for instance—were directly taxed.
Costa Rica has also experienced substantial structural adjustment reform—
a process which started in the mid 80s, some five years before El Salvador. These
reforms and Costa Rica's membership of the CACM have affected trade policy in a
very similar way to El Salvador—tariff rates have been substantially reduced (Table
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8), especially for industrial consumer goods and virtually all import quantitative
restrictions and regulations have been eliminated. At the same time, the scope of
export taxes has been greatly reduced,' and the level of export duties that still remains
is now significantly lower.
Table 8. Nominal Import-Tariff Protection in Costa Rica
Percentages
1987 1994
Primary sector 4.8 6.2
Food. bev. and tob. 59.1 15.1
Textiles and apparel 41.1 19.9
Paper and printing 27.3 4.9
Chemical products 12.2 5.7
Non-met. mineral prod. 23.8 9.3
Metal products 14.2 8.6
Other manufacturing 21.7 9.3
Source: Calculations based on SIECA (1993) and WTO (1995).
Simultaneously to this unilateral trade liberalisation, Costa Rica has also
embarked on some reciprocal, regional trade liberalisation—which, incidentally, has
entailed changes to the CACM treaty. Costa Rica signed a free trade agreement with
Mexico in 1994, which went into effect at the beginning of 1995. It has also been
engaged in negotiations to establish a free trade area with Colombia and Venezuela,
though no formal agreement has been reached.
5 Costa Rica still applies taxes to its exports of coffee, bananas, meat and livestock. See WTO
(1995).
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Costa Rica's trade reforms have been accompanied by changes in its foreign
investment regime, seeking to make the country more attractive to foreign companies.
The idea has been to foster growth not only by reducing distortions but also by
increasing capital accumulation. Foreign investment is also supposed to be a response
to the need of reducing unemployment and increasing productivity levels; the latter to
the extent that FDI can give rise to technology transfer benefiting eventually domestic
firms as well. Costa Rica's reforms of its FDI regime, however, have not been as far-
reaching as those in the area of trade policy. They have consisted mainly of the
abolishment of restrictions on international capital movements, and the partial lifting
of foreign ownership restrictions in some economic activities. However, important
foreign ownership restrictions still continue in place in activities such as banking and
insurance, telecommunications, and energy (Nathan and Associates, 1994). Foreign
investment in newspapers and advertising agencies is prohibited, while regulations in
the transport and tourism sectors discriminate against foreign investors and set limits
to their participation.
Recent Costa Rican efforts to attract FDI have focused on the subscription
of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with some developed countries. Among other
things, these BITs provide national treatment to foreign investors, as well as the op-
tion of international arbitration in dispute settlement. They are also consistent with
the World Trade Organization's provisions on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMs), which ban the use of performance requirements. As of 1994, Costa Rica
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had established BITs with Switzerland and Germany, and was in the process of ne-
gotiating similar agreements with the United States and Spain. Regional free trade
agreements—such as the one subscribed with Mexico in 1994—are also intended to
make the country more attractive to foreign investors as they enlarge the size of the
market in which Costa Rican goods can be sold duty-free.
Unlike many developing countries' foreign investment regime (see, e.g., UNC-
TAD, 1993), the Costa Rican FDI regime does not contain incentives available only
to foreign investors. Some export promotion schemes benefit to a large extent foreign
companies but they are also available to domestic firms. This is the case of duty-free
trade zones and other very similar schemes presently being implemented in Costa
Rica. They offer firms not only tariff exemptions for goods used in production but
also generous tax holidays. Tax incentives for firms operating in duty-free trade zones
in Costa Rica consist of full income tax exemption for 10-12 years, and 50 percent
exemption for the following 4-6 years (WTO, 1995). 6 They also provide full exemp-
tion on taxes on capital and assets for an indefinite period of time. Though the main
objective of these schemes is export promotion, firms operating in duty-free zones are
allowed to sell up to 40 percent of their output in the domestic market (WTO, 1995).
6 The fact that many developed countries use the credit mechanism when taxing foreign-source
income often makes these income tax incentives largely ineffective when their beneficiaries are foreign
companies.
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The next Section describes the model used to simulate the effects of unilat-
eral trade liberalisation on welfare in Costa Rica, once FDI responses and interna-
tional capital income taxation are taken into consideration.
2.3 A Trade Model with Foreign Direct Investment and
Capital Income Taxation
The model we use here is basically a variant of the one used in Chapter 1.
The model has been changed in several directions, simplifying it in some aspects and
making slightly more complicated in others. First, we have eliminated a number of
model features non-essential to the point we want to make in this Chapter. Thus, we
now only concentrate on import tariffs and capital income taxes. Similarly, the current
version no longer includes a foreign exchange rate, and abstracts from the presence of
differences in factor returns across sectors. 7 With macroeconomic and distributional
elements no longer being an issue here, the model has also been simplified on those
fronts. There is now only one type of good (consumption), one household, and two
aggregate factors of production.
On the other hand, we now use a multi-country model structure, where world
prices for goods (and factors) are endogenously determined. In this structure, capital
is internationally mobile (and inter-sectorally mobile, as in the previous model). In
fact, we now distinguish between domestic and foreign capital, and allow for the
7 The latter implies that, in the empirical implemention of the model, units for factors of produc-
tion are redifined in such a way that factors receive the same return in all sectors.
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possibility of different returns to them. The capital allocation issue is now two fold-
sectoral and international. The income tax regime in the new version is slightly more
complicated in that there is now international capital income taxation, and countries
use the tax-credit mechanism when taxing foreign source income. We turn now a
fuller description of the new model version.
2.3.1 Production
There are two countries, 8 A and B, each producing n goods (n>1), some
of which (at least) are tradable. Production technology is similar as in the previous
model—in each country a fixed-proportion combination of value added and interme-
diate inputs is required (henceforth we use superscripts to denote countries, and omit
subscripts to index sectors), with intermediate inputs, in turn, required in a fixed
proportion:
xA . min (nA _zA)
' ' aA
X B = min (QB ZB)
ZA = aAXA;
ZB = aB X B .
8 In the empirical implementation of the model we consider in fact three "countries," including a
"Rest of the World." To keep notation as simple as possible and avoid repetition, throughout this
section we abstract from this third region.
' aB
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where X is gross output, Q is value added and Z represents intermediate inputs.
The as denote the fixed amount of intermediate goods required to produce a unit of
output.
Value added requires the use of two primary inputs, labour and capital, L
and K, whose supply is assumed to be fixed. These primary inputs are combined
according to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function:
QA (LA KA ) _	 (LA)-crA + ( 1 _ ceA)(KA)-1-*4	 (2.5)
QB ( LB , KB) ,),B[aB(LB)-oB + ( 1 _ ct.6)(KB)-aBi--,4	 (2.6)
where the Q A s denote value added, the -ys are shift parameters, the as are share
parameters and the as reflect the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital
in each country (elasticity, c i = 1/(1 ± a)).
Furthermore, it is assumed that labour is internationally immobile while
capital can move freely across countries. Capital used in the production in each
country is an aggregate of domestic capital (Kd ) and foreign capital (K,), which are
viewed as imperfect substitutes.' This specification allows for the consideration of
the phenomenon of cross-hauling in international capital flows, reflected by balance
of payments data. The corresponding aggregate capital function is given by
KA (K" , K ,jrti ) = [6A (K , 1`4 ) - PA + (1— 6A )(Kg) -PA F PIA ;	 (2.7)
9 This capital specification has also been used in some models of taxation in open economies (e.g.
Wang and Pereira, 1994). In a dynamic setting, Bovenberg (1986) also uses an specification like this
for investment goods.
(2.9)
(2.10)
anA a K A
'1/47,A = (1 — TA ) PsA 	
aKA (2.11)
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KB (4 KmB ) =	 (K31) -PB + (1 6B ) (KmB ) -PB i-725
	 (2.8)
where the Ss are share parameters and the ps reflect the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign capital in each country (elasticity, E 2 = 1/(1 p))
2.3.2 Capital Income Taxation and Factor Allocation
We assume that both countries tax their capital on a world-wide basis and
grant credits for taxes paid abroad. The maximum amount of tax credit is the cor-
responding home country tax liability. Countries are assumed to apply the same tax
rate to foreign-source and domestically-generated income. Taxation in each country
does not discriminate between income from foreign capital and income from domestic
capital generated internally. In each country, the rate of return is in principle different
for domestic and foreign capital.
The equilibrium conditions for factor demand are as follows:
For labour,
nn A
ujA	 	.
aLA
nns
pB
&LB'
where the Px are output prices, and the ws represent country wage rates.
For foreign capital,
anB aKB
141, = (1 — TB)P: 	
a.K B aKg (2.12)
,A _
 BV
'd (2.13)
B, 
= 
AV inrn (2.14)
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where the urns are the net rates of return on foreign capital, and the TS denote the
tax rates on capital income.
Equilibrium in the international allocation of capital requires that capital of
a given nationality earns the same net return regardless of where is used (domestically
or abroad). That is,
where vid (i=A,B) represents the return to domestic capital in each country.
We also assume that there is perfect competition both in goods and factor
markets, and that factors are fully employed.
2.3.3 Consumption and Trade
As in Chapter 1, imported and domestic goods, M and D, respectively, are
assumed to be imperfect substitutes for each other. Traded goods consumed in each
country are a composite, C, of M and D. Similarly, for exports we again use a
Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function.
Countries levy tariffs on their imports at rates tA and tB . Thus, the domestic
price of imports inclusive of tariffs is
PmA = P4A (1 + tA );	 (2.15)
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pmB = pirtB (1 + t13), 	 (2.16)
where the P 	 the import world prices faced by each country.
2.3.4 Income
It is assumed that revenue from income and trade taxes is returned to consumers in a
lump-sum fashion. Thus, assuming also that T A > TB , and that profits from foreign
capital are fully repatriated to the home country once the corresponding domestic
income taxes have been paid, augmented income is given by
IA = wALA +rK 4i + (1+ TA —2TB )r,„B KmB + TA rmA 'CIA ± tA PZMA ,	 (2.17)
113 = co l 3 LB + rY Ki3 + (1 _ TA) rinA KmA + TB rrriBKmB + tBnijmw iviB,	 (2.18)
where the rds and rms are the gross rate of return on domestic and foreign capital,
respectively.
2.3.5 Market Clearing Conditions
Equilibrium in the goods market requires
yA = DA + mA;	 (2.19)
yB = D B + MB .	 (2.20)
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The clearing conditions are for factor markets are
LA
 = /4; (2.21)
LB = 41,
for labour, with Lis denoting labour supply in each country; and
(2.22)
KA = IC,41 + KmB; (2.23)
KB
 = Kr + KniA, (2.24)
for capital.
2.4 Data and Parameter Calibration
The model described above has been calibrated to a 1990-91 data set on
production, trade and FDI for the economies of Costa Rica and a group of OECD
countries. The latter is made up of those countries which, as of 1991, offered credits
for taxes paid by their foreign investors in countries with which they did not have an
agreement to avoid international double taxation of capital income.' This suits also
the case of Costa Rica, who, as of 1994, had not signed a treaty like that with any of
the OECD countries included in our group, except Germany (who, in any case, uses
the crediting mechanism with treaty-countries also). These countries are responsible
10 These countries are: Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and the USA.
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for more than 80 percent of FDI in Costa Rica. As mentioned earlier, the empirical
implementation of the model also includes a "Rest of the World." OECD countries
which do not use the foreign tax credit mechanism are included in the Rest of the
World, together with developing countries.
The model contains 10 sectors and one household. We have aggregated
the primary sector into one basically because of the lack of data on capital flows.
In disaggregating the manufacturing sector—whenever data constraints have allowed
us—, we have tried to separate those activities which have achieved a relatively high
degree of development by Costa Rican standards. The model includes separately a
non-tradeable sector (some non-traded services and construction) which, in Costa
Rica (for 1991), has no international capital flows.
The production and trade-flows data for the Costa Rican economy comes
from the Central Bank and the Ministry of Economy of Costa Rica. Sectoral foreign
capital stocks in manufacturing have been obtained on the basis of foreign capital
shares in overall capital income in each sector. Foreign capital stocks for agriculture
and services were obtained from UNCTAD's World Investment Directory 199.4. These
were combined with estimates of aggregate capital stocks in those sectors to obtain
sectoral domestic capital stocks. As no information on taxes paid by foreign compa-
nies is available, we assume that no income tax exemptions are given to them," , and
that they pay the legal 20 percent rate on their profits.
This is consistent with Costa Rica's FDI regime, though not with its free-duty zone legislation
(see Section 2.2).
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Table 9 presents the basic data used for the economy of Costa Rica. This is
a semi-industrialised economy with a relatively large service sector. Manufacturing
activities in Costa Rica—especially light industry—have traditionally enjoyed a high
tariff protection vis-a-vis agriculture, and tended to rely more heavily on imports,
particularly of intermediate and capital goods. Exports make up more than a fifth of
output in the economy as a whole; they are especially important in the primary sector,
where more than 42 percent of gross output is exported. However, manufacturing is
by far the main contributor to overall export earnings, with a share of more than 40
percent.
The share of capital in value added in the Costa Rican economy has tradi-
tionally been high, especially in manufacturing, where it exceeds 60 per cent. Capital,
however, is overwhelmingly owned by nationals in all sectors of the economy. Com-
pared to some larger Latin American countries, for instance, foreign capital has not
played a particularly important role in the economy of Costa Rica.' FDI in this
country has tended to concentrate more in manufacturing. An unusual feature for
an economy not particularly endowed with natural resources is the relatively high
share of FDI that has gone to agriculture. The United States is by far the single
most important foreign investor in Costa Rica, with American companies controlling
12 Indicators on the importance of foreign capital in Latin American countries are usually scant
but those existing are quite revealing: In Brazil, in 1990, more than 40 percent of overall profits
in the economy were generated by foreign affiliates; while in Mexico, in 1986—when the Mexican
foreign investment regime was still very restrictive—more than half of all assets were controlled by
foreign affiliates (UNCTAD, 1994, Vol. 4, Table 9).
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about a quarter of FDI in the manufacturing sector, and virtually all foreign capital
in agriculture (UNCTAD, 1994, vol. 4).
Production data, including input-output flows, for the group of OECD coun-
tries comes from OECD (1995), and is based on data for Canada, Germany, Japan,
the United Kingdom and the USA. Trade flows net of intra-regional trade have been
computed from information from OECD's Statistics of Foreign Trade by Commodity
1992 for the same countries. Sectoral foreign capital stocks are based on the share
of foreign assets in aggregate assets in each sector for the same group of countries,
excluding Canada (for which this information was not available). The data is based
on information from UNCTAD (1994). These production, factor use and trade data
have been scaled up to reflect the corresponding OECD aggregates.
Tariff rates refer to MNF tariffs corrected by the coverage of the Generalised
System of Preferences (GSP) programme in each sector. 13 For completeness, Table
10 presents some base data for the group of OECD countries.
Regarding elasticities, the trade elasticity values used for Costa Rica are,
for consistency, basically the same as those used for El Salvador in Chapter 1 (the
differences reflect differences in sector aggregation). As indicated in Chapter 1, these
values are based on estimates by Hinojosa et al. (1994). To take account of relative
country size—at least in a qualitative sense—we use higher elasticity values for our
' 3 We have used the proportion of items within each sector covered by the GSP programme in the
United States.
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Table 9. Selected Benchmark Data for Costa Rica
QSH MIY EIX KIQ KmIK Tariff*
Primary sector 0.180 0.126 0.424 0.573 0.167 0.0004
Food. bey. and tob. 0.100 0.067 0.295 0.678 0.062 0.087
Textiles and apparel 0.017 0.495 0.468 0.547 0.096 0.139
Paper and printing 0.016 0.392 0.096 0.647 0.153 0.041
Chemical products 0.019 0.606 0.222 0.645 0.095 0.040
Non-met. mineral prod. 0.010 0.288 0.156 0.658 0.337 0.147
Metal products 0.005 0.836 0.472 0.712 0.422 0.053
Other manufacturing 0.034 0.582 0.275 0.686 0.111 0.069
Tradeable services 0.376 0.085 0.192 0.520 0.027 n.a.
Non-tradeables 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.275 0.000 n.a.
Overall 1.000 0.214 0.219 0.498 0.073 0.052
Column headings:
QSH: Share in GDP
NI/Y: Share of imports in supply
EIX: Share of exports in output
KIQ: Share of capital income in value added
Km/K: Share of foreign capital income in aggregate capital income
* Ratio of tariff revenue to imports. This column is quite different from those in Table
8 both because it corresponds to a different year (1991) and because takes into account
exemptions and the existence of free trade within the CACM.
n.a. = not applicable
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Table 10. Selected Benchmark Data for OECD Countries Using Tax Credits
QSH M/Y EIX KIQ KnilK Tariff
Primary sector 0.034 0.119 0.015 0.683 0.005 0.035
Food. bey. and tob. 0.025 0.037 0.020 0.357 0.034 0.041
Textiles and apparel 0.011 0.171 0.025 0.226 0.020 0.086
Paper and printing 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.265 0.005 0.017
Chemical products 0.023 0.020 0.064 0.300 0.025 0.032
Non-met. mineral prod. 0.001 0.027 0.024 0.323 0.065 0.043
Metal products 0.023 0.026 0.036 0.295 0.005 0.028
Other manufacturing 0.112 0.046 0.077 0.206 0.005 0.031
Tradable services 0.265 0.009 0.017 0.379 0.009 n.a.
Non-tradeables 0.479 0.000 0.000 0.445 0.000 n.a.
Overall 1.000 0.023 0.023 0.393 0.073 n.a.
Column headings:
QSH: Share in GDP
MIY: Share of imports in supply
EIX: Share of exports in output
KIQ: Share of capital income in value added
Km/K: Share of foreign capital income in aggregate capital income
n.a. = not applicable
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group of OECD countries." As to input-substitution in value added, we again use
a Cobb-Douglas specification. In the absence of empirical estimates, the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign capital, in turn, has been assumed to
be 1.25 and 2.0 in Costa Rica and the group of OECD countries, respectively, in all
sectors. 15
 We carry out sensitivity analysis on the values for trade and capital sub-
stitution elasticities (our sensitivity analysis exercise for trade trade elasticities uses
estimates based on Reinert and Roland-Holst). Finally, shift and share parameters
are obtained through the same calibration procedure described in Chapter 1.
2 5 Simulation Results
We have used the model and data described above to quantify the welfare
gains, or losses, to the economy of Costa Rica from completely eliminating import
tariffs. We also compute the optimal tariff structure for this economy in the presence
of taxation of foreign capital income. Our result discussion focuses on Costa Rica
since we are concerned with the case of a small economy (we discuss briefly some
simulation results for the group of OECD countries at the end of this section). Central
case results for this country are presented in Table 11.
Table 11 presents the impact on capital flows of trade liberalisation as well
as the optimal import-tariff structure when foreign capital is taxed and there are
14 Again, given the empirical estimates by Reinert and Roland-Hoist (1992) and Shiells and Reinert
(1993) for the US, this places our elasticity values definitely on the high side.
15 Wang and Pereira (1993) use a Cobb-Douglas specification for domestic and foreign capital, but
do not provide any empirical support for it either.
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Table 11. Costa Rica: Trade Liberalisation Effects and Optimal Tariff Structure
Central Case
I. Liberalisation Effects
1. Welfare (EV change as a % of GDP)
A. With no foreign capital taxation 0.23
B. With foreign capital taxation -0.07
2. Capital Stock (% change in aggregate level) -0.66
II. Optimal Tariff Structure (tariff rate, %)
Primary sector -5.01
Food. bev. and tob. 0.18
Textiles and apparel -0.30
Paper and printing -0.03
Chemical products 1.75
Non-met. mineral prod. 3.82
Metal products 3.97
Other manufacturing 6.24
Tradable services n.a.
Non-tradeables n.a.
n.a. = not applicable
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foreign tax credits. It also compares the welfare effects of trade liberalisation when
foreign capital is not taxed with those when it is taxed. With no taxation of foreign
capital income, the optimal commercial policy consists effectively of free trade. Trade
liberalisation causes an outflow of capital of 0.66 percent, which, in the absence
of foreign capital taxation, does not hurt the economy and is in fact accompanied
by a slight welfare improvement (the small size of this improvement is the result
of relatively low tariffs—which, furthermore, generally do not exhibit a great deal
of dispersion, as shown in Table 8). Geographically, the outflow of capital follows
roughly the composition of FDI between OECD countries and the rest of the world.
At a sectoral level, capital tends to leave especially those activities enjoying higher
tariff protection. The intuition for capital leaving the country is provided by the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Since in Costa Rica import-tariff protection is higher for
manufacturing activities (Table 8), its elimination tends generally to contract these
activities. Given that in this economy manufacturing goods tend to be intensive users
of capital relative to others, its contraction reduces the demand for capital, making
this factor's return fall.
With foreign capital being taxed, the outflow of capital produced by com-
plete tariff elimination would cause welfare to fall by about 0.07 per cent. This results
from lower income tax revenue and lower national income. The small size of the wel-
fare decline suggests that the optimal tariff structure is not very different from free
trade—and in fact this turns out to be the case (Table 11). Under the optimal tar-
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if structure with foreign capital taxation, agricultural imports would be subsidised
whereas those of manufacturing goods would be generally subject to a tariff. Optimal
tariffs tend to be higher in those sectors using capital more intensively, and which
have a larger FDI share (metal products and other manufacturing, especially).
The low level of the optimal subsidy and tariff is basically driven by the
relatively modest role played by foreign capital in the Costa Rican economy (Table
8). Of some significance is also the fact that trade intervention distorts consumption
patterns as well. Substitution elasticities also play a role, though this is not very
important in absolute terms (Tables 12 and 13). Furthermore, the pattern of results
across sectors remains basically unchanged as elasticity values are varied. In Table 12
we present sensitivity analysis results on trade elasticities. The simulation exercise has
been performed using elasticity values based on Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992)—
which, as suggested earlier, are generally smaller for manufacturing activities than
our central case values (as in Chapter 1, we have left the elasticity for our primary
sector unchanged and lower that for services by half).
Lower trade elasticities imply that trade liberalisation has a weaker impact
on goods relative prices and thereby on relative factor returns. This leads to free
trade causing a smaller outflow of capital, which, in turn, generates lower welfare
losses when foreign capital is taxed (Table 12). However, the level of optimal tariffs is
now higher. The intuition for this runs as follows: since the effect of tariff on relative
factor returns is now weaker, a larger tariff is needed to generate a capital inflow (and
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Table 12. Costa Rica: Sensitivity Analysis on Trade Elasticities*
I. Liberalisation Effects
1. Welfare (EV change as a % of GDP)
A. With no foreign capital taxation 0.18
B. With foreign capital taxation -0.05
2. Capital Stock (% change in aggregate level) -0.58
II. Optimal Tariff Structure (tariff rate, %)
Primary sector -5.08
Food. bev. and tob. 0.21
Textiles and apparel -0.33
Paper and printing -0.04
Chemical products 2.12
Non-met. mineral prod. 4.21
Metal products 5.54
Other manufacturing 7.02
Tradable services n.a.
Non-tradeables n.a.
* Trade elasticities are based now on Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992).
n.a. = not applicable
66
Table 13. Cota Rica: Sensitivity Analyses on Capital Elasticities*
I. Liberalisation Effects
1. Welfare (EV change as a % of GDP)
A. With no foreign capital taxation 0.25
B. With foreign capital taxation -0.08
2. Capital Stock (% change in aggregate level) -0.77
II. Optimal Tariff Structure (tariff rate, %)
Primary sector -4.21
Food. bev. and tob. 0.12
Textiles and apparel -0.21
Paper and printing -0.02
Chemical products 1.15
Non-met. mineral prod. 2.56
Metal products 3.21
Other manufacturing 4.02
Tradable services n.a.
Non-tradeables n.a.
* Capital substitution elasticities are now 2.0 in all sectors
n.a. = not applicable
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tax revenue gain) of a given size. In addition, lower trade elasticities imply that the
traditional resource misallocation cost of tariffs is smaller, and so the capital-inflow
consideration in choosing tariffs (which push them upwards) becomes relatively more
important.
With a higher degree of substitution between foreign and domestic capital
(the corresponding elasticities are now equal to 2.0 for Costa Rica), the capital-outflow
effect of trade liberalisation is also strengthened (Table 13)—which is consistent with
the fact the return to capital has fallen. Accordingly, the negative welfare impact
under foreign capital taxation is magnified. As to the new optimal tariff structure,
this does not change much but the average level optimal tariffs decreases. The latter
simply reflects the fact that, with a larger capital elasticity, a smaller change in the
relative return to capital and—therefore a smaller tariff—is required to bring a capital
inflow (and tax revenue) of a given size.
We have also computed the welfare gains for Costa Rica from directly sub-
sidising capital (the first-best policy) instead of using import tariffs/subsidies, as
discussed in Section 2.1. Results (for the central case specification) show that this
would increase welfare by only 0.02 percent in comparison with the optimal tariff
scenario. This modest gain is not surprising given that the optimal-tariff level across
sectors is quite small and does not present a great deal of dispersion (Table 11).
Increasing the tax on foreign capital income to a level similar to the OECD
average (approximately 38 percent, in 1991, for countries using the credit mechanism)
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would generate greater welfare gains (twice as much) than a switch to a direct subsidy.
In a more disaggregated model, this number should be smaller, as our calculation
does not take into consideration the fact that companies from countries with a tax
rate lower than the OECD average will find themselves with non-refundable excess
credits and might therefore prefer to locate in a different country. Despite this, a
greater tax rate on foreign capital income might still be a superior option to the
direct subsidy and seems to be more feasible as well. The current Costa Rican rate
implies a revenue transfer to countries using the credit system—an outcome difficult
to justify on economic grounds.
Finally, the group of OECD countries included also loses from trade liber-
alisation but for entirely different reasons. Given its huge size in relation to Costa
Rica, its optimal tariff structure cannot be one of free trade. Simulation results
(not reported here) show that this structure consists of positive and relatively large
import-taxes for agriculture and manufacturing activities regardless of whether for-
eign capital is taxed or not. Taxation of foreign capital slightly increases the optimal
tariff in agriculture and reduces it in the majority manufacturing activities. The in-
tuition for this results is that the agricultural sector for the group of OECD countries
included in the model is in fact capital-intensive relative to the bulk of manufacturing
activities (and services).
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2.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this Chapter we have used a calibrated general equilibrium model to quan-
tify the welfare impact of trade liberalisation and compute the optimal tariff structure
for Costa Rica once trade-policy-induced capital flows and foreign capital taxation
are taken into account. Our main finding is that with foreign capital being taxed
and the foreign-tax-credit system in force, the complete elimination of import tariffs
would hurt Costa Rica. This to the extent that tariff removal will lead to an outflow
of capital and a loss of tax revenue that more than offset the positive traditional
reallocation effect of moving to free trade. Thus, the optimal tariff structure for the
Costa Rican economy does not consist of zero-import tariffs but rather of a mixture of
positive import tariffs and subsidies. The optimal tariff and subsidy level is, however,
quite low, reflecting basically the fact that the role of foreign capital in this economy
is relatively modest. A direct subsidy to foreign capital is a slightly superior option
to import tariff, though probably not feasible and little effective in practice. There
seems to be some room for a different, probably more effective option—increasing the
tax on foreign capital income. For some reason, Costa Rica has not exploited this
opportunity and foreign capital taxation is low in comparison with OECD standards,
resulting in a transfer of revenue to capital exporting countries' governments.
Given the relatively small level of optimal tariffs/subsidies, and the fact that
there seems to exist some costs associated with non-uniform-tariff structures (such
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as rent-seeking-related costs, for instance), our finding cannot be taken as providing
a strong case against free trade in an economy such as the Costa Rican. Also, it
must be bear in mind that the (static) nature of our model is unable to capture
dynamic gains often associated with trade (Stokey, 1991; Young, 1991). At the same
time, it should be noted that even if we restrict our analysis to the static cost and
benefits of freer trade, trade liberalisation typically does not consist of a complete
tariff elimination, but rather of a reduction in the level of protection and its dispersion.
Therefore, even in the presence of foreign capital taxation, trade liberalisation, as
usually practised, could still improve welfare for a small open economy—even in a
static context. Our numerical simulations imply, however, that allowing for capital
flows and their taxation might reduce the size of static gains from non-full, unilateral
trade liberalisation.
It should also be noted that we have considered only one side of the relation
between trade liberalisation and FDI. There are at least two aspects which might
lead to a different relationship. First, there are other strands of trade liberalisation,
such as reciprocal trade liberalisation—whether global or regional—, which might be
complementary with FDI in countries with a relatively abundant labour supply. The
various NAFTA models that tried to incorporate foreign capital effects for Mexico
were formulated with the idea that such an agreement would increase FDI flows into
the Mexican economy. Second, it is evident that not all FDI located in developing
countries—or, in this case, in Costa Rica—is "tariff-jumping" investment. There
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are multinational companies which locate there with the idea of exporting back to
their home countries. To the the extent that it is quite likely that unilateral trade
liberalisation would be beneficial to these companies, freer trade would encourage this
type of FDI inflows. The size of this type of FDI flows vis-a-vis those motivated by
tariff-jumping considerations is therefore a crucial element. Lack of information has
not allowed us to do this comparison for Costa Rica.
CHAPTER 3
LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND
DECOMPOSITION OF WAGE INEQUALITY
OUTCOMES
A vast volume of literature has emerged on the explanation of the re-
cent trend towards rising wage inequality documented for a number of developed
countries—most notably the UK and the US. 1 The debate on the factors respon-
sible for this phenomenon initially concentrated on the relative roles of trade and
technology—and, to a lesser extent, other factors related to market forces (e.g. changes
in factor supplies, immigration, and foreign direct investment). 2 More recently, a
number of empirical studies have examined the contribution of changes in labour
market institutions to observed wage inequality surges. 3 These studies suggest that
institutional changes—defined basically as changes in the degree of labour market
flexibility—have in fact played an important role in increased wage inequality (Card,
1996; Dinardo et al., 1996; Dinardo and Lemieux, 1997; Grottschalk and Joyce, 1998;
Machi and van Reenen, 1998). 4 The institutional factors this literature has paid
1 There is extensive evidence documenting this rise in wage inequality. See, for example, Davis
(1992); Kosters (1994); OECD (1997); and Grottschalk and Smeeding (1997).
2 See the surveys by Bound and Johnson (1992); Burtle,ss (1994); Deardorff and Hakura (1994);
and Brenton (1998).
3 0n the analytical side, Davis (1998a,b) sets out a framework to examine the role of labour
market institutions in wage dispersion and unemployment in a global context.
4 Institutional forces have also been found to play an important part in the level of wage inequality
across industrialised countries (e.g., Blau and Kahn, 1996).
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attention to include the presence of trade unions and collective bargaining, and gov-
ernment policy towards the labour market (e.g. the erosion of real minimum wages,
or reduced scope for minimum-wage legislation) .5
In this Chapter we also examine the role of labour market institutions in
wage inequality outcomes, but follow a different approach from that found in the
empirical literature. Existing econometric-based studies try either to decompose ob-
served changes in wage inequality into separate components due to trade, technolog-
ical change and changes in labour market institutions (e.g. Machi and van Reenen,
1998), or test the relationship between changes in wage dispersion and changes in
institutions (e.g. Card, 1996). Here, we are interested in comparing an economy's
response to trade and technology shocks under given, alternative labour market in-
stitutional frameworks.
Our approach is similar to that followed in Davis (1998a,b) in an analytical
setting, where the wage and employment effects of trade (Davis, 1998b) and technol-
ogy (Davis, 1998a) shocks are separately analysed under alternative labour market
arrangements. Here, we analyse an economy's response when these shocks take place
at the same time, and focus on the relative contribution of each of them to the re-
sulting wage inequality under alternative labour market institutions. Specifically, we
5 Changes experienced by a number of industrialised economies in this area during the 1980s are
documented in, e.g. Faber (1990); Ride11 (1992); Gosling and Machin (1995); and Machin and van
Reenen (1998).
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examine how the presence of rigidities in the market for unskilled labour affects the
decomposition of wage inequality outcomes into trade and technology components.
The incorporation of labour market rigidities into models trying to determine
the effect of trade and technology on relative wage changes seems natural since the
majority of OECD economies—especially in Europe— still exhibit varying degrees of
labour market inflexibility (see, e.g. Machin and van Reenen, 1999). Furthermore,
it is in a context of at least some labour market rigidity that trade and technology
shocks have taken place.
We employ a version of the differentiated goods model first set out in de Melo
and Robinson (1989). This is a two-factor, two-produced-goods model, incorporating
imperfect substitution in preferences between domestic and imported goods. We
modify this structure to consider institutional rigidities in the market for unskilled
labour in the form of a fixed real minimum wage, which allows for unemployment of
this factor. 6
 The presence of this type of labour market rigidity makes our model
similar in spirit to the ones specified in Brecher (1974), Corden and Findlay (1975),
and—as suggested earlier—Davis (1998a,b). The model can be also considered as a
generalisation of the two-factor, two-good Heckscher-Ohlin structure, reverting to this
form as the substitution elasticity between domestic products and imports becomes
sufficiently large.
6 Matusz (1996) presents an analytical general equilibrium trade model where unemployment
results from the presence of efficiency wages.
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Abrego and Whalley (1999) have found differentiated-goods structures to be
preferable to the pure Heckscher-Ohlin version for conducting multi-sector, general
equilibrium-based empirical analysis of trade shocks. One of the reasons for this
is that, as also discussed in Johnson (1966), under non-extreme conditions of factor
use, the Heckscher-Ohlin structure generates a nearly-linear transformation frontier—
which makes an economy move towards complete specialisation following even small
changes in relative goods prices. This feature renders basically impossible the task of
numerically computing the wage inequality impact of relative prices changes of the
magnitude that have taken place in some industrialised economies in the last couple
of decades.
We calibrate our model to UK 1990 data on production, consumption, trade
and factor use as well as on international price and technology changes over the period
1976-90. We then simulate the impact of trade and technology shocks that occurred in
the UK over this period, both in the presence and absence of labour market rigidities.
To perform the decomposition exercises, we follow a methodology set out in Abrego
and Whalley, and compute separate equilibria for trade, technology, and combined
shocks.
Under fully flexible labour markets, increased wage inequality is basically
the result of technological change, with trade playing only a minor role. The presence
of rigidities in the market for unskilled labour significantly changes this decompo-
sition, increasing the relative contribution of trade. For our central case parameter
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specification, this change in decomposition is only quantitative, as the dominant fac-
tor continues to be technological change. However, for some model parameterisations
consistent with existing ranges of empirical estimates for key parameters, the change
brought about by the introduction of labour market rigidities is also qualitative, as
it turns trade into the dominant factor.
The Chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 briefly reviews the literature
on trade, technology and wage inequality. Section 3.2 presents the model we use for
our decomposition exercises. Section 3.3 describes the data used and our model
calibration. Section 3.4 discusses results, and Section 3.5 draws some conclusions.
3.1 A Brief Review of the Literature*
The literature on trade and wages focuses on understanding the quantitative
significance of trade in explaining the sharp increase in OECD wage inequality which
has occurred during the 1980s. This increase in inequality has been documented
for a number of OECD countries, most notably the US and the United Kingdom
(e.g., Davis, 1992; Kosters, 1994; OECD, 1997; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997).
The pattern has been observed across different types of workers according to their
skills (low vs. high skill), education levels (college vs. non-college graduates), and
experience. There has also been documentation of a rise in unemployment in some
* This Section draws partially on Abrego and Whalley (1999).
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European countries without major increases in wage inequality (Kosters, 1994; OECD,
1997; Dewatripont et al., 1998)
A large volume of literature has emerged on the explanation of increased
wage inequality, especially for the US case. Two major factors have been discussed
as primarily responsible for this phenomenon: increased trade with low-wage devel-
oping countries, and technological change biased against unskilled labour. The great
majority of research has concluded that skilled-biased technological change, rather
than trade, is the main source of this increase in wage inequality.
This literature uses a variety of econometric methods. Early papers focused
on how trade changes labour demand via the factor content of trade (e.g. Borjas et
al., 1991; Murphy and Welch 1991, and Katz and Murphy , 1992). They typically
ran regressions which linked labour demand (by type of labour) and trade flows, and
then used actual trade flows to infer the changes in labour demand they imply. They
then combined these labour demand changes with wage elasticity of labour demand
estimates culled from the literature to infer what portion of actual wage changes are
due to trade changes. This work generally came to the conclusion that the portion
of actual wage change attributable to trade is small.
Conclusions based on factor content of trade calculations, were, however,
criticised by Wood (1994), who argued that trade is a considerably more important
factor than these analyses show. He argued that for many products, and especially
those from developing countries, there is no comparable domestic product, and so
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factor substitution effects attributed to trade using conventional elasticities are un-
derstated. He also argued that technological response to trade will occur in expecta-
tion of future trade surges, and so some of what is attributed to technology in factor
content analyses should in reality be attributed to trade.
Later papers in the area use a different approach, and relate relative product
price changes to relative wage changes (e.g. Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993; Baldwin
and Cain, 1997; Learner, 1998; Haskel and Slaughter, 1999; Harrigan and Balaban,
1999). Many of these work with estimating equations derived from general equilibrium
models of a Heckscher-Ohlin type. The majority of these studies conclude that skilled-
biased technical change was the main source of increased wage inequality during the
1980s, with the role of trade being insignificant.
Other recent work regresses measures of factor shares on measures of out-
sourcing and other factors (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Anderton and Brenton, 1998;
Autor et al., 1998) concluding that trade may be more important than in earlier anal-
yses. Anderton and Brenton (1998), in particular, find that trade is more important
when only trade with developing countries rather than with all countries is used as
an explanatory variable.
Although it has been widely assumed for some time that increased wage
inequality in OECD countries has been mainly the result of skill-biased technological
change, there has been a lot discussion about the specific form taken by technological
change. The prominence of the skill-biased hypothesis in the literature reflects the
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fact that, in spite of a rise in relative wages for skilled workers, shifts in the compo-
sition of employment towards skilled labour have been of an intra-industry type as
opposed to inter-industry (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Berman, Bound and Griliches,
1994; Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998). However, this hypothesis has been chal-
lenged on theoretical grounds by both Learner (1994 and 1998), and Haskel and
Slaughter (1998). Appealing to the zero profit conditions of a two-factor, multiple-
good Heckscher-Ohlin model, they argue that only sector-biased technological change
can affect relative wages in a small open economy. Using the traditional two-good,
two-factor version of Heckscher-Ohlin, Learner (1994) argues that the factor bias of
technological change is irrelevant for wage inequality and only sector bias matters.
Leamer (1998) qualifies this result, demonstrating that factor bias is irrelevant only
for small changes, and if technological change does not induce relative price changes.
For discrete changes, Learner shows that factor bias can matter through second-order
effects involving changes in inputs and wages.
The sector-bias hypothesis has, in turn, been challenged by Krugman (2000)
and Berman, Bound and Machin (1998). Krugman criticises Learner (1994), arguing
that global (affecting other countries at the same time) factor-biased technological
change will affect relative wages in a small open economy, whereas the sector-biased
variety will be irrelevant. He recognises that if technological change is local (i.e. it
only takes place in the country in question), factor bias is irrelevant and only sector
bias matters. Krugman shows this using a closed-economy model with Cobb-Douglas
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preferences and Leontief technology, but argues that the last two assumptions in
particular are not crucial for his argument, which he suggests is valid for a large
economy.
Trying to reconcile these opposite views, Haskel and Slaughter (1998) main-
tain that the relevant form of technological change is both skill and sector-biased,
supporting their argument both analytically and empirically. On the analytical front,
they specify a two-good, two-factor, two-country model with CES production tech-
nology, and show that in a small economy only sector-and-skill-biased technological
change can affect relative wages. For the large-economy case, they find that the effect
of both sector-biased and sector-neutral technological change is ambiguous. At an
empirical level, Haskel and Slaughter test their sector-and-skill-biased hypothesis us-
ing manufacturing-sector data for 10 OECD countries, and find a strong correlation
between such a type of technological change and changes in wage inequality. Berman,
Bound and Machin (1997) empirically test the global skill-biased hypothesis by test-
ing two of its implications. One is whether the intra-industry shifts towards skilled
labour observed in the US have also occurred throughout the developed world; and
the other is whether these shifts have been concentrated in the same industries in
different countries. Using data for 10 OECD countries they find evidence consistent
with these predictions, and conclude that global skill-biased technological change has
been the principal cause of increased wage inequality in OECD countries.
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A central feature of the emperical analyses in this literature is its use of
reduced-form data in their estimations. There has been indeed very little work ex-
plicitly employing structural models. In the literature using econometric-modelling
techniques, exceptions are Learner (1998), and Harrigan and Balaban (1997), where
structural forms are estimated. As to structural models using applied general equi-
librium techniques, to the best of our knowledge, the only papers in which the role
of trade and technology are examined within an AGE structure are Francois and
Nelson (1998) and Abrego and Whalley (1999). Francois and Nelson compare the
pure Heckscher-Ohlin structure with differentiated goods models as well as with a
Heckscher-Ohlin version including intermediate goods. Their numerical simulation
analysis focuses on the relative intensity of trade effects on wages (presence or ab-
sence of a magnification effect, and/or absolute losers) under different model struc-
tures. Abrego and Whalley explore the numerical properties of the conventional
Heckscher-Ohlin structure vis a vis those of a differentiated goods model, and try to
do decomposition analysis for both of them. They do not consider alternative labour
market institutions and concentrate on the perfectly competive case only.
3.2 A Model for Decomposition Analysis
A large proportion of the literature trying to explain recent trends in wage
inequality employs models based on the standard two-good, two-factor Heckscher-
Ohlin structure. The conceptual suitability of this model for examining the effect of
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trade-related changes on relative wages has been widely discussed in this literature
(e.g., Deardorff and Hakura, 1994; Learner, 1994, 1998). As shown in Abrego and
Whalley (1999), however, the standard Heckscher-Ohlin structure presents difficulties
for doing empirical analysis trying to determine the effect of price changes on wage
inequality within a multi-sector, general equilibrium setting. On the one hand, due to
the near linearity of the transformation frontier associated with convenient functional
forms (see also Johnson, 1966), even small changes in goods relative prices move the
economy towards full specialisation. 7
 This renders virtually impossible the simulation
of the impact of observed price changes on wage dispersion.
On the other hand, the model can generate a considerable degree of ambigu-
ity as to the relative importance of trade and technology in observed changes in wage
inequality—there are multiple parameterisations consistent with a given wage disper-
sion outcome, with some of them allocating a dominant role to trade, and others to
technology. In addition to these problems, and as suggested in the previous Section,
the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin model has difficulties accommodating skill-biased
technological change in the small open economy case—unless this is assumed to be
global in nature.
Here, we use a differentiated-goods model, in which domestic goods and
imports are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. This model removes the problems
7 In the UK case, at least, a consequence of this is that changes in relative prices constituting
only a small fraction of the actual changes are able to generate wage inequality effects stronger than
those observed.
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of specialisation associated with the standard Heckscher-Ohlin structure, largely be-
cause the heterogeneity between imports and domestic goods implies an imperfect
pass-through of world price changes onto prices for domestically produced goods.
Similarly, to the extent that it incorporates (partial) endogenous price determina-
tion, the differentiated goods structure used here is able to accommodate skill-biased
technical change in a small economy. This is important for our case since we use
a sigle-country model and cannot therefore consider global factor-biased technical
change, but want to analyse the experience of a small open economy. However, as
shown below, this differentiated goods can still generate a large degree of ambiguity
in decomposition when labour market rigidities in the form of a real minimum wage
are present.
The differentiated goods model we consider here is similar to the one set
out in de Melo and Robinson (1989), discussed in Bhattarai et al. (1999), and used
in Abrego and Whalley (1999). Unlike the pure Heckscher-Ohlin structure, in this
model, imports and domestically produced goods are imperfect substitutes in con-
sumption. The present structure also differs from trade models used in previous
Chapters in that product differentiation is present only on the consumption side, i.e.
there is no differentiation between domestically consumed goods and exports on the
production side. The reason for this is that we want to remain as close as possible
to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin structure used in most of the trade and wages lit-
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erature, and for which analytical results establishing an unambiguous link between
trade and relative wages are available.
In the structure we use here, imports are not produced domestically, and one
of the domestically produced goods is not traded. Imports and exports are assumed
to be traded at fixed world prices. The model remains a two-produced-goods, two-
factor structure with two traded goods, but includes three goods on the consumption
side. The structure generalises the Heckscher-Ohlin model since it asymptotically
approaches it as the elasticity of substitution between domestically produced goods
and imports becomes very large.
3.2.1 Preferences
Let us denote imports by M, exports by E, and goods produced only for
domestic consumption by D. Preferences are defined over these three goods, with
D and E being the two produced goods. Unlike in the pure Heckscher-Ohlin model,
preferences are now relevant, and, in our small-country case, one price—the price of
D—is endogenously determined.
Preferences are given by
V = V (Ed , Cd ),	 (3.1)
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where .01 denotes domestic demand for the exportable good, and C d
 is demand for a
composite of imports and the domestic import substitute Dd , i.e.,
cd	 (m Dd)	 (3.2)
3.2.2 Production
We consider a small open, price-taking economy that produces two goods.
One of these (D) is consumed domestically only, and the other (E) is both consumed
domestically and exported. The varieties of E produced for exports and the internal
market are assumed to be exactly the same. The production of each good requires
the use of two factors—skilled labour, and unskilled labour:
YE = YE( UE, SE);
	 (3.3)
YD YD(UD, SD),	 (3.4)
where Yi (i=D ,E) denotes output, Ui
 represents unskilled labour, and Si is skilled
labour. In the empirical implementation of the model, we take D as being intensive
in the use of U.
Prices for exports and imports are fixed, and given by PE, Pm, respectively.
The price of the domestic good, PD , is, however, endogenously determined. The per
unit cost functions for the production of each good consistent with zero profits are
pE G E (wl )wS),	 (3.5)
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Pp _ GD (wU ,T47.5), (3.6)
where WV and Ws are the wage rates of unskilled and skilled labour, respectively,
and Gi (i = D,E) represent unit cost functions.
3.2.3 Labour Markets
Unskilled and skilled labour are assumed to be available in fixed supply,
which is given by U and ST , respectively. We model two types of labour market insti-
tutions. In the first one, perfectly competitive conditions exist, and labour markets
clear In the second labour market type, we assume complete flexibility in the mar-
ket for skilled labour, while the unskilled labour market is assumed to be subject
to a fixed real wage. This could be the result of some form of bargaining between
unskilled-workers trade unions and employers, but here we abstract from the specific
reason for unskilled-wage rigidity.
Using Shephard's Lemma, the employment condition for unskilled labour is
given by
acp	 acE
 -
YE	 = U — N,awu	 awu
where N represents unemployment of unskilled labour—which is endogenously deter-
mined, and different from zero in the presence of a real minimum wage. N is equal
to zero under perfectly competitive conditions.
(3.7)
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Flexibility in the skilled labour market implies that this factor will be fully
employed. The market clearing condition for this factor is given by
acE,	 aGE -
YD	 + YE -	  Saws	 aws	 ,
3.2.4 Market Clearing for Goods
The representative household in this economy maximises the utility function
(3.1) subject to the budget constraint
PD Dd + Pm M + 15EEd = Wu (U — N) + W s g .	 (3.9)
In equilibrium, the price of the domestically produced good, PD * , will be
determined such that market clearing occurs in D, i.e.
YD = D'.
	
(3.10)
No market clearing is required in either E or M. Walras law, which holds for
demand functions generated from utility maximisation subject to a budget constraint,
also implies that trade balance will hold, i.e., in equilibrium,
Pm M = PE E,	 (3.11)
(3.8)
where E represents exports.
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3.2.5 Functional Forms
In the numerical implementation of the model, preferences for (non-exportable)
domestic goods, imports, and exportables are represented through a two-level nested
Cobb-Douglas/CES aggregation. Preferences for imports and (non-exportable) do-
mestic goods are given by
cd(m,Dd) [6	 + (1— 6)(D d)cl °
C
1 ,	 (3.12)
where 6 denotes the share of imports in aggregate demand for importables, and a is
the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic (non-exportable) goods.
Preferences for exportables and importables are modelled via a Cobb-Douglas
function
v(Ed, cd)	 (Ed) 9 (cd)i- e ,	 (3.13)
where 9 represents the share of exportables.
Goods are produced using a constant return to scale, CES technology, with
constant elasticity of substitution between S and U:
= 7i Pi	 + ( 1 —	 i] Pi i = D,E,	 (3.14)
where -yi denotes units of measurement, f3i is a share parameter, and pi determines
the elasticity of substitution, 7 j , between Ui and Si , with 1 . As indicatedl+pi
earlier, our model parameterisation implies i3D > pE , i.e. the import substitute, D,
is unskilled-intensive.
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Profit maximisation subject to (3.14) implies
147, =	 (Liu y+Pi
y1ws =	
/3i)
"Yi
where PEa.-  PE.
= D,E
	 (3.15)
i = D,E	 (3.16)
Modelling of Trade and Technology Shocks
We model the trade shock as a decline in the price of imports (Pm), rather
than as a change in the volume of trade, which is endogenously determined. This is
consIstent with the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson analytical framework, which relates
changes in relative factor prices to changes in relative goods prices (see, e.g. Deardorff
and Hakura, 1994; Learner 1994, 1998). In line with the findings in the bulk of
the empirical, econometric-based literature, we assume that unskilled labour saving
technological change occurs, and take this as being pervasive, rather than sector-
specific. 8 This differ from Abrego and Whalley (1999), where technical change is
assumed to be Hicks-neutral, and sector-biased (which can be accommodated by the
Heckscher-Ohlin structure used there). We model skill-biased technological change
as a uniform reduction in the share of unskilled labour (p i ) in the two sectors.
8 The hypothesis of sector and skill-biased technological change has been little explored in the
literature, with Haskel and Slaughter (1998) seemingly being the only authors examining it. As
indicated in the previous Section, they find empirical support for it.
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3.3 Data and Parameter Calibration
This section describes the data used for the parameterisation of our model
and the implementation of trade-and technology-related decomposition exercises. We
have calibrated the model to a 1990 data set on UK production, consumption, trade,
and factor use. Data on production, consumption and trade flows come from the UK
input-output table for 1990. The data on trade covers all UK trade partners, and
have been adjusted for model consistency, i.e. to ensure that trade is balanced in the
base case equilibrium. Wage and employment data by sector and skill category have
been obtained from Employment Gazette and New Earnings Survey. All these data
are aggregated into the two-good, skilled (exportable good) and unskilled intensive
(domestic good) classification. The parameters used for model implementation are
presented in Table 14.
The definition of 'unskilled' and 'skilled' workers we utilise goes beyond the
manual and non-manual classification frequently used in the literature (e.g. Haskel
and Slaughter, 1999; Abrego and Whalley, 1999). We have followed a UK Office for
National Statistics Office classification, according to which each skill category includes
both manual and non-manual workers, depending on the specific type of job performed
by workers. This information is available for the manufacturing sector only, and so we
assume that the other sectors of the economy use skilled and unskilled labour in the
same proportion. The production sectors included in our domestic, unskilled-intensive
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sector are those that for the 1990 input-output table level of disaggregation were
net importers of goods or services, plus non-traded sectors (public administration,
utilities and construction). Our exportable, skilled-intensive sector is then made up
of the remaining sectors. This aggregation produces a ratio of factor use of unskilled
to skilled labour of 0.85 for the unskilled-intensive sector, and 0.52 for the skilled-
intensive sector, in our 1990 base case.
Table 14. Central Case Parameters for UK Decomposition Model
Domestic
Goods
Exportable
	 Imported Composite
Share Parameters
Production
Unskilled labour 0.46 0.34 n.a. n. a.
Skilled labour 0.54 0.66 n.a. n.a.
Consumption
Top level n.a. 0.34 n.a. 0.66
Bottom nest 0.80 n.a. 0.20 n.a.
Elasticities
Production 2.50 2.50 n.a. n.a.
Consumption
Top level n.a. 1.0 n.a. 1.0
Bottom nest 1.25 n.a. 1.25 n.a.
n.a. = not applicable
The values for the elasticities of substitution in production and consumption
that we use are within the ranges of empirical estimates reported in Hamermesh (1993)
for the former, and Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992) for the latter. These ranges imply
values in the neighbourhood of unity for the substitution elasticity between domestic
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goods and imports, and between 1.5 and 6.0 for production-side elasticities. The
central case values we have chosen for consumption and production are 1.25 and 2.5,
respectively. We carry out systematic sensitivity analyses over the literature-based
ranges for both sets of elasticity values.
The data on relative price changes for goods used in our trade shock mod-
elling are based on Neven and Wyplosz (1996). They disaggregate import price
changes for manufacturing both by sector (which they also disaggregate according
to different factor-skill intensities) and origin of imports (between developed and
developing countries), and cover the period 1976-90. This source, together with in-
formation on the composition of UK imports by country of origin for 1990, gives a
decline in the relative import price of the unskilled-labour intensive good of 7.9% over
the period.
The size of technological change, which as indicated earlier we model as a
decline in the share of unskilled labour for both sectors in the production function, A,
is obtained as follows. Machin and van Reenen (1998) have found that, for the UK, the
relative contribution of technological change to the decline in the employment share
of non-production workers in manufacturing during 1973-89 was 22%. Combining this
estimate with information from the UK Office for National Statistics on the fall in
the employment share of unskilled labour in manufacturing over the period 1976-90,
we find that unskilled-labour-saving technological change reduced this share by about
2.5%. We use this number as an estimate of the technology shock in our simulations.
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3.4 Simulation Results
The effects of the trade and technology shocks are simulated under the two
labour market scenarios described in Section 3.2—fully flexible labour markets, and
market for unskilled labour subject to fixed real wage. To carry out decomposition
exercises for each model variant, we first remove the trade shock only and compute
a model solution; we next restore the trade shock, remove the technology shock and
solve the model again; finally, we remove simultaneously both shocks to get a new
model solution yielding the effect of the two factors.
Table 15. UK Wage Inequality and Unemployment Decomposition: Central Case
Model
Fall in Wu
 IWs (%)
Trade contribution (%)
Technology contribution (%)
Unemployment of U (%)
Trade contribution (%)
Technology contribution (%)
Flexible Wage	 Fixed Wage
4.23 1.17
1.92 40.45
98.08 59.55
0.00 7.30
0.00 35.04
0.00 64.96
3.4.1 Central Case Results
Our labour market central case results are reported in Table 15. These re-
sults show technology as the main factor behind increased wage inequality—regardless
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Table 16. UK Decomposition Model: Central Case Sectoral Effects
Flexible-Wage Model
Trade	 Technology
Output change (%)
Exportable 0.38	 0.56
Domestic -0.29	 -0.44
Consumption change (%)
Exportable -0.01	 0.58
Domestic -0.29	 0.94
Imports 10.48
	 0.51
Fixed-Wage Model
Trade	 Technology
Output change (%)
Exportable 0.36	 -1.60
Domestic -0.31	 -2.23
Consumption change (%)
Exportable -0.02	 -1.63
Domestic -0.31	 -2.23
Imports 10.47
	 -1.51
of the institutional arrangement in the labour market. The reason for this is that,
due to the imperfect substitutability between domestic goods and imports, the trade
shock tends to be accommodated by changes in the level of imports, rather than pro-
duction; the technology shock, in contrast, tends to be accommodate more by changes
in production (Table 16). This pattern is also reflected in the decomposition of the
unemployment outcome in Table 15—which, incidentally, is very similar to that of
the wage inequality outcome for the fixed-wage case.
However, taking account of the existence of rigidities in the market for un-
skilled labour significantly changes the decomposition of the wage inequality outcome,
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rising the contribution of the trade shock. The intuition for this result has to do with
how the effects of each shock are spread throughout the economy. The trade shock
effect is basically driven by a change in the scale of output—the relative price change
leads to a contraction of the unskilled-intensive sector, which reduces demand for
unskilled labour and thereby the relative price of this factor. There is also a substi-
tution effect going on here, but this is of second order—the fact that unskilled labour
becomes cheaper increases its demand and partially dampens the initial decline in
its relative price—and is dominated by the scale effect regardless under both labour
market institutional arrangements. The contraction of the unskilled-intensive sec-
tor is, however, more acute in the presence of wage bargaining, which seems natural
since a relatively higher wage rate for unskilled labour will affect more using more
intensively.
The technology-shock effect, in turn, is fundamentally derived from a sub-
stitution effect. In this case, the change in technology makes unskilled labour less
productive (by reducing its marginal product), leading to substitution away from
it and to a decline in its relative price. This favours the unskilled-intensive sector,
giving rise to a second-order scale effect whereby the initial relative-wage change is
partially reversed. When wage bargaining is present, the technology shock will tend
to reduce output in both sectors. This differs from the flexible wage case, where
only the unskilled-intensive sector contracts. Thus, the second-order, scale effect is
stronger under wage bargaining, and the technology shock causes a smaller decline
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in Wu /Ws . This, together with the fact that the unskilled intensive sector contracts
more in the presence of bargaining following a trade shock, makes this factor more
important in the wage inequality outcome when trade unions are present.
Note that, independently of the labour market specification used, the earn-
ings inequality effect from trade and technology shocks is quite small, and certainly
smaller than the observed change in wage inequality over the period. 9
 This suggest
that other factors have also played a significant role in this phenomenon.
34-2 Sensitivity Analysis
We have performed sensitivity analyses on the values for the elasticities of
substitution in consumption and production. We have varied elasticity parameters
over a range roughly consistent with available literature estimates. The ranges we
have experimented with are 1.05 to 2 for the consumption-side elasticity, and 1.5 to
6 for the the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour.
Table 17 summarises our sensitivity analysis results. These results confirm
that elasticity parameters are crucial in determining the wage inequality outcome,
not only in terms of its magnitude but also in terms of decomposition into trade and
technology components. We should highlight two points emerging from our results.
First, for some parameter values, the dominant force behind the resulting earnings
9 Unskilled workers' relative earnings fell by approximately 15% in the UK over the period 1976-90
(Author's calculations based on information from the Office for National Statistics)
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inequality outcome switches from technology to trade. This makes decomposition re-
sults quite ambiguous. Furthermore, the parameter changes that are able to reverse
the role of trade/technology from dominant to minor factor are not really extreme.
For example, reducing the production-side elasticities from 2.5 to 2.0, while keeping
consumption parameters at their central-case levels, dramatically alters the decom-
position.
Table 17. Ranges for Trade Contribution to UK Wage Inequality
central
case
Parameter Range
a = 1.05 - 2.0
	 71 = 2.0 - 6.0
Fall in Wu !Ws
 (%)
Flexible wage model 4.23 4.17 - 4.45 3.93 - 4.57
Minimum wage model 1.17 1.16 - 1.20 0.98 - 1.42
Trade contribution (%)
Flexible wage model 1.92 0.39 - 7.37 3.37 - 0.75
Minimum wage model 40.45 37.13 - 50.37 95.91- 13.71
The degree of ambiguity resulting in the minimum wage case is even more
dramatic than that reported in Abrego and Whalley (1999) for the standard Heckscher-
Ohlin model under flexible labour markets. 1 ° With fully flexible wages, the decom-
position is so skewed in favour of technology (Table 15) that we were not able to find
10The constraints there are, however, more stringent than here since ambiguity is defined as
different parameterisations producing the same wage inequality outcome (with qualitatively different
decompositions).
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model parameterisations—consistent with literature-based estimates—able to reverse
the dominant factor and generate some degree of ambiguity.
Second, the sign of the technological change effect can vary depending on
the values used for the production-side elasticities. Values close to the lower limit of
Hamermesh's range (different from those in Table 17) yield that technological change
actually favours unskilled workers. 11 . As discussed above, there is a substitution effect
and a scale effect associated with the technology shock. The latter implies indeed an
expansion of the unskilled-intensive sector, which naturally favours unskilled labour.
Here, with factor-substitution possibilities being relatively low and additionally con-
strained by the fixed real wage, the scale effect outweighs the substitution effect,
resulting in a higher relative wage for unskilled workers.
3.5 Summary and Conclusions
This Chapter has used a calibrated general equilibrium model to examine
the role of labour market institutions in decomposition results of wage inequality
outcomes into trade and technology components. Our main finding is that, compared
to fully flexible labour markets, the presence of rigidities in the market for unskilled
labour significantly alters this decomposition, rising the contribution of trade. For our
central-case parameter specification, the change in decomposition results, though of
11 We could have included these results in Table 17, but chose not to so in order to make result
presentation there clearer. In this case, the increase in wage inequality is all due to trade.
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sizeable magnitude, is only quantitative, as it still leaves technology as the dominant
factor. Sensitivity analyses on consumption and production-side elasticities show,
however, that, for some parameterisations still consistent with empirical estimates for
these parameters, the increase in the contribution of trade trade with a real minimum
wage is large enough to switch the role of trade from minor to dominant in the wage
inequality outcome.
These results have at least two implications. First, institutional arrange-
ments in the labour market have an important bearing in the outcome of wage in-
equality decompositions. Given the fact that a number of industrialised economies
with recent wage inequality surges still present at least some degree of labour market
inflexibility, this feature should probably be incorporated in models trying to de-
compose relative wage changes for them. Second, giving the amplitude of the range
of empirical estimates on some key parameters—such as substitution elasticities in
production—decomposition results are quite ambiguous when labour market rigidi-
ties are present. Abrego and Whalley (1999) how that, under fully flexible labour
markets, this phenomenon occurs in standard Heckscher-Ohlin models but is unlikely
to show up in a differentiated goods model. The fact that it is also present in a
more general model lends additional support to the claim that models in which the
underlying structure of the economy is explicitly specified are probably better suited
for conducting meaningful decomposition of wage inequality outcomes. By its own
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nature, their reduced-form counterparts are indeed unable to discriminate between
alternative economy structures or paramterisations.
Finally, our finding that—regardless of the degree of labour market flexibility
and model parameterisation—trade and technology account for only a fraction of the
observed change in earnings inequality in the UK suggest that other factors should
probably be brought into the picture as well. These factors might include, for example,
changes in factor supplies and changes—if not in the level—in the sectoral patterns
of foreign direct investment.
CHAPTER 4
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: BARGAINING
OUTCOMES FROM LINKED NEGOTIATIONS
Since the early 1990s trade and environment has been a high profile issue,
with environmental groups arguing that restrictions are needed on certain types of
trade (species, tropical lumber, pollution intensive manufactures) to safeguard the
environment, and less developed countries (LDCs) opposing what they see as a new
threat of trade restrictions against their exports. Where countries fail to institute
policies which internalize global or cross-border environmental externalities, environ-
mental groups argue that appropriate trade restrictions can improve resource alloca-
tion. Trade liberalisation advocates, on the other hand, see trade measures as very
much second-best environmental policy, and worry over environmental legitimization
of new trade restrictions by protectionist interests.
This Chapter discusses possible LDCs participation in possible future linked
trade and environment negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), which
we suggest would largely break down on North-South lines. The South we see as the
custodian of yet to be used environmental assets (forests) and the North as having
a high existence value on these assets due to higher income. Whether or not envi-
ronmental justifications for the use of trade restricting policies should be part of any
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future (post Uruguay Round) trade negotiations is now a central issue. Developed
countries (DCs), responding to pressures from their own non-government environmen-
tal organizations, have supported their inclusion, while LDCs have appeared more
reluctant to engage in a linked negotiation; they instead seek direct compensation for
implementing growth slowing environment protecting policies.
In this Chapter, we argue that global (and also cross-border) environmental
externalities provide LDCs with strategic leverage over the use of trade restrictions
by DCs against their own exports. Although GATT/WTO tariff barriers in OECD
countries are now low, sectoral barriers in textiles, apparel, footwear, steel and other
areas are still significant, as are voluntary export restraints, regulatory restrictions
in services, and the use of anti-dumping and countervailing-duty measures. Linking
environmental and trade negotiations thus gives developing countries opportunities to
restrain adverse trade policy in DCs, with environmental concessions being available
to bargain for lower trade barriers to their exports. Linkage expands the bargaining
set, offering more opportunity to exchange concessions, which can result in more trade
and lowered barriers. Seemingly, linked trade and environment negotiations should
be embraced by both the developing and developed world as expanding the choice set
for bargaining, leaving the question remaining as to why LDCs are opposed.
The literature on linkage between international trade and environmental
quality has primarily focused on two related questions: whether international trade
contributes to lowered environmental quality (e.g., Anderson, 1992a; Anderson, 1992b;
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Dean, 1992; Rauscher, 1992); and whether trade liberalisation is desirable, both in
terms of global efficiency and individual-country interest, when environmental emis-
sions are not internalized (e.g., Dean, 1992; Pearce, 1992). The policy debate on
trade and environment has also often been interpreted as reflecting concerns over
these forms of linkage. In both the academic and the policy debate there seems to
be a presumption that linkage between trade and environmental policies is weak and
that trade policies are ineffective instruments of environmental protection—a conjec-
ture confirmed by model-based estimates of trade-environment linkage (Perroni and
Wigle, 1994). As Blackhurst and Subramanian (1992) have pointed out, there are also
strategic reasons for linking trade and environmental policies in multilateral negotia-
tions. The complementarity between trade and environmental policies, which stems
from the asymmetric structure and distribution of the gains and losses across high and
low income countries associated with each of these two policy dimensions, can also
make global cooperation easier to sustain when pursued through linked negotiations.
This strategic linkage between trade and environmental policies does not
seem to have been directly addressed in the literature. Barrett (1994) and Ulph
(1996a, 1996b), among others, have studied the interaction between trade and envi-
ronmental policies theoretically, but define the strategic element from the standpoint
of the market structure in which firms operate. Copeland and Taylor (1995) examine
environmental policy games between open economies; they mention the possibility of
a linkage between North-South trade and environmental policies, but do not explore
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it in detail. Other paper mention possible strategic trade and environment linkages
within a North-South dimension but indeed focus on different issues include Barret
(1994), Chichilnisky (1994), and Sandler (1993).
The papers that are most closely related to the analysis we present here are
Cesar and Zeeuw (1994), Folmer et al., (1993) Spagnolo (1996), Carraro and Sinis-
calco (1994), Ludema and Wooton (1994), and Nordhaus and Yang (1996). 1 The first
two papers build a general framework linking environmental cooperation with coop-
eration in some other, non-specified area. Cesar and Zeeuw, in particular, show that
cooperation in both areas is sustainable provided that the two games roughly offset
each other Spagnolo and Carraro and Siniscalco's papers models linked international
negotiations within a repeated game framework. In these papers, however, the policy
games examined are fully independent of each other, which is not the case for trade
and environmental policies. Ludema and Wooton use a partial equilibrium model to
examine a non-cooperative policy game between two countries in the presence of a
cross-border externality, but do not explore the possibility of environmental policy
cooperation, although they point out a linkage between trade and environment could
be implicitly present in some free trade agreements involving countries of different
size. Nordhaus and Yang use a multi-region dynamic general-equilibrium model to
compute non-cooperative Nash equilibria in environmental policies as well as cooper-
'Schulz and Barbier (1997) have independently developed an analytical model of trade and en-
vironment very similar to the one we use here. The policy games discussed in their model are,
however, more limited in scope than the ones we deal with here. We became aware of this paper
only after the first versions of the present one had been completed.
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ative equilibria where countries adopt globally efficient policies to reduce emissions.
In their model, however, bargaining solutions are not examined and no interaction
between trade and environment is considered.
Here, we explore this negotiation linkage using a two-region (North-South)
numerical simulation model of world trade and environment, benchmarked to 1990
data and projected over a 100-year time horizon. We compute non-cooperative Nash
equilibria (disagreement outcomes for bargaining), and bargaining outcomes (Nash
bargaining) for trade negotiations only and joint negotiations over trade and the en-
vironment. The trade side of the model is a conventional heterogeneous products
(Armington) model, in which trade elasticities play a key role. The environmental
structure of the model involves environmental assets in the South which are depleted
more rapidly when used in trade-related production activities, and whose existence
value enters North's preferences considerably more strongly than is the case for South-
ern preferences. The calibration of the model involves some strong assumptions and
adjustments of data for model admissibility, but generates a specification with sharply
asymmetric North-South preference weightings on environmental asset depletion.
The central case results we generate show that, relative to free trade, the
South (as the smaller region) loses in a trade war. A trade-only negotiation helps
both the North and South in lowering trade barriers, but leaves large barriers in
the North. A joint trade and environment negotiation allows the North to gener-
ate welfare gains from Southern environmental management and the South to lower
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Northern trade barriers. The main theme is that LDCs should embrace a trade and
environment negotiation as it provides them with more leverage over trade. How-
ever, in a negotiation with side payments the South does considerably better than in
a constrained negotiation, suggesting that a trade-environmental policy negotiation
may be an inferior option; that is, a negotiation of cash compensation is better for
them.
In our concluding section, we also note that trade rule constrained bargaining—
in which existing trade rules (such as MFN) are taken to imply restrictions on the
bargaining set—may yield a different picture. If we consider trade and environment
linkage as a proposal under which MFN trade rules would also be relaxed where en-
vironmental effects are at issue, and if an initial weakening of MFN could lead to
further system-wide weakening in other areas, then LDCs' concerns over a trade and
environment negotiation may be more firmly based. In such cases, gains from ex-
panded bargaining could be more than offset by losses from the weakening of prior
agreed restraints on trade policy.
The Chapter is structured as follows. The next Section describes the struc-
ture of the model, while Section 4.2 discusses the data and methodology used for
calibration. Section 4.3 describes our experiments and presents our findings. Section
4.4 concludes.
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4.1 A Two-Region Trade and Environment Model
We consider a world consisting of two regions, which we refer to as 'North'
(N) and 'South' (S). Focusing on a two-region structure avoids the numerical com-
plexities associated with computation of non-cooperative equilibria in higher dimen-
sions, and allows us to focus on two-player cooperative solution concepts. Compu-
tational limitations in working with non-cooperative and cooperative game-theoretic
solutions concepts, rather than more traditional competitive equilibria, thus severely
restrict dimensionality in the numerical analysis.
We consider an environmental asset, E, which is entirely owned by the
South, and can be viewed as a stock reflecting available tropical habitat. Each region
produces two goods, a tradable good X, a non-tradeable good Y. Region S uses two
factors in production, value added V, and the natural resource asset. Production in
region N only uses value added. We again use an Armington structure in consump-
tion, and assume that each region views tradable produced domestically and abroad as
imperfect substitutes, and consumes both domestic and imported traded goods, along
with own region non-tradeables. The environment (available habitat) is depleted by
its use in production, and enters the utility function of each region. Depletion occurs
more heavily from use in production of the traded good. The endowment of value
added is constant in each region, and equal to Gi (i = N, S).
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4 .1.1 Production
The structure of production in the model is set out in Figure 1. CES func-
tions are used, in which value added and the environmental asset can be transformed
into an environment-using input at the lower level of nesting. At the higher level of
nesting,
the environment-using input and value added are transformed into tradable and non-
tradeable output. We use substitution elasticities of zero at the lower level, and of
unity at the higher level. Value added used in the two levels of nest can be transformed
at a constant marginal rate of transformation, which, for simplicity, we assume to be
equal to unity. The rationale for using this construction is that it implies a non-
zero cost for the environment-using input even when pollution taxes are zero; this,
in turn, prevents infinite substitution away from other inputs. The main difference
between the tradable and non-tradeable goods sectors lies in the share parameters on
the environment-using input.
4.1.2 Prices and Environmental Taxes
Net-of-tax prices for value added and the environment-using input are de-
noted as pi (i N, S) and are the same within each region. Each unit of environment-
using input employed in production in region S reduces global environmental quality
(LEVEL 2)	 cy=0
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Figure 1. CES Production Structure in the Model (South Region)
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by an amount €. We consider taxes on the use of the environmental asset at rate TS ,
and hence the gross-of-tax price of the environment-using input in the South is
pES pS ETS	 (4.1)
Value added and the environment-using input are both used in the production of
tradable and non-tradable through unitary substitution elasticity, constant-returns-
to-scale technologies. Thus, domestic prices of domestically produced goods are equal
to unit costs:
N	 N N\.	 S_ Si S S n ,
Pj	 Cj kr) ))
	 Pj	 ejkP 'PE)) j= X, Y.	 (4.2)
For given output levels vi (i	 N, S, j = X, y) we can write aggregate
domestic demands for the environment-using input (using Shephard's Lemma) as
acq
DS —ELq 3E	 = X, Y.	 (4.3)3 014
4.1.3 Environmental Quality
Environmental quality enters the preferences of both the North and the
South, but with a substantially higher share parameter in the North, reflecting the
differential existence value placed on environmental assets by region. The quantity of
environmental assets entering preferences as existence value equals the initial stock of
assets less that amount used up in production (through deforestation, for instance).
The period used for the model is a number of years or decades, during which significant
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depletion can occur depending upon the policy regime. For given demands for the
environment-using input, environmental quality is then given as
Q = Q — e(DZ),	 (4.4)
where Q denotes the initial endowment of the environmental asset (before use in
production).
4 .1. 4 Trade and Dem,and
Each region levies ad valorem import tariffs at rates e, where superscripts
refer to the importing region. The gross-of-tariff price of imported tradable is thus
qN
 = (1 + tN )K;	 qs = (1+ ts)gIc .	 (4.5)
Given preferences, a level of environmental quality Q, commodity prices p, qi , and
incomes I, utility maximization yields uncompensated demands for domestic goods,
and uncompensated import demands, M. The marginal valuation for environ-
mental quality in each country v i , is also a function of the same variables.
Expanded income in each region is written as the value of resource endow-
ments, plus tariff revenue, plus revenues from environmental levies, plus the (shadow)
value of environmental quality (note that the latter is a function of income itself, which
makes the definition of P implicit):2
2This is added to income since environmental quality is purchased at its shadow price, but this
price is not actually paid between countries, i.e. the North makes no actual payment to the South
for the existence value of environmental quality they enjoy.
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(4.6)
(4.7)
= pN GN tN pSc m N vN Q;
= pSGS +tSpxN mS + 7_S EDES +vSQ.
.4.1.5 Market Equilibrium
Market clearing for competitive equilibrium in which use of the environmen-
tal asset is only charged through environmental levies requires the following:
LI,v(
 = D + Ms ;
=	 ,
DiE E	 . =Gi3 apt
where DD.' =0.
.4.1.6 Choice of Functional Form
In the numerical implementation of the model, unit cost functions for trad-
able and non-tradeables production are a Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution (CES)
aggregation of the environment-using input and value added prices in the South re-
gion:
L'3'c =- D:sy + MN ; (4.8)
i = N , S; (4.9)
i=N,S;	 j= X, Y; (4.10)
s	 mi–os 
	
( 7.1S )1 -SI S S _r
Cj U51 ,pE)	 [(1—	 ) (p 3 kEE
os] i_ps
j = X , Y;	 (4.11)
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where the Ps are the elasticities of substitution between the environment-using input
and value added, and the as are share parameters. Note that, since the environment-
using input is not utilized by the North, the corresponding cost function is simply
Preferences for domestic goods and imports in each region are represented
by a two-level nested Cobb-Douglas/CES aggregation of the form
(1-0i)oi
cri— 
D, MA, ML) (f4) ei [6i
 (Dix) 1 cri• + (1 —	 i = N, S;
(4.12)
where Oi is a share parameter for non-tradeables demand; 61: refers to the share of
domestic goods in total tradable demand; cr i
 is the elasticity of substitution between
same-region tradable and tradable produced in the other region.
Preferences for consumption and environmental quality are represented by
a Cobb-Douglas utility function:3
(Q , Hi )	 (Hi)1-71i ,	 i = N, S;	 (4.13)
where i is the Cobb-Douglas share parameter on environmental quality.
4.1.7 Policy Games in the Model
The model incorporates trade policy parameters in the form of tariffs, and
environmental policy parameters in the form of environmental charges. A traditional
3 For this specification, the marginal valuation for environmental quality is proportional to (non-
expanded) income.
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tariff game can be analysed (as in Johnson, 1953-4) in which regions play strategically
against one another in tariffs. With the North being large and the South small,
the presumption is that the North will gain from such a retaliatory game while the
South will gain little, or more likely lose. There is also an environmental game that
can be analysed in terms of environmental charges associated with the use of the
environmental asset. Since the South owns the environmental asset and the North
places a high existence value on it, the South can use a policy instrument jointly
with trade policy in a linked trade and environment game which can result in lower
Northern trade protection.4
In using the model, therefore, we go beyond conventional numerical simu-
lation work which mainly focuses on Walrasian competitive equilibria, by computing
non-cooperative equilibria and bargaining outcomes. To do this, we iterate over cal-
culations of optimal policy responses by individual regions, subject to a full set of
general equilibrium constraints (as set out above) until convergence to a Nash equi-
librium is achieved. We are able to do this separately for the tariff game and for
the linked trade and environment game. We also compute cooperative bargaining
solutions associated with these games, adopting Nash's (1950) bargaining solution.
This is the most widely used cooperative solution concept in the literature, although
4 Throughout our analysis we maintain the assumption that countries in each bloc are able to
coordinate policies among themselves in an inter-bloc non-cooperative equilibrium. Even though
the necessary environmental institutional arrangements are not currently in place for such intra-bloc
coordination to take place, they could well emerge in the future as has been the case in the trade
area. In UNCTAD, for instance, the G77 emerged as the common developing country demand for
special and differential treatment in GATT gained momentum in the 1970s.
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others, such as Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975), could alternatively be used. In computing
bargaining solutions, we take the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium solution utilities
as representing the disagreement point, simulate the utilities possibilities frontier un-
der cooperation, and apply the Nash criterion to the product of the differences in
region utilities along the frontier and disagreement utilities.
In our central case, with trade or trade and environment games, no side
payments are considered, and thus the resulting outcomes remain second-best allo-
cations. Typically in such equilibria there will be less than full internalisation of the
environmental externality. We also compute bargaining with side payments. This re-
alizes a full Pareto optimal allocation, and allows us to assess how far towards Pareto
optimality a joint trade and environment policy-based negotiation could move.' Note
that side payments should not be interpreted as implying lack of negotiation linkage:
if there were no environmental agreement, zero tariffs would not be optimal even with
side payments. Thus, the side payments we compute here represent net compensation
for environmental restraint by the South in conjunction with trade policy cooperation.
5 Alternatively, one could view cooperation as reflecting a subgame perfect equilibrium of an
infinitely repeated game, supported by the threat of future punishment in response to unilateral
deviations from a coordinated strategy (trigger strategies). In such a formulation, it would be
possible to explore whether a linked trade-environmental policy game makes cooperation in both
areas easier to sustain in comparison with a scenario where the trade and environment dimensions
of strategic interaction are examined in isolation from each other.
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4.2 Data and Model Parameterisation
We have calibrated the model to a 1990 base case projected forward over a
period of 100 years. The economies of the North and the South are both assumed
to lie on a growth path on which value added, production and consumption grow
at a constant rate, reflecting average growth rates over the period 1985-93. Data
for this period implies rates of growth of 2.5% and 4% for the North and South
respectively. We assume a discount rate of 5%. The production and consumption
(and hence trade) data we use are based on information taken from World Bank
(1992), World Bank (1995), and IMF (1995). Production activities are disaggregated
into two parts: traded and non-traded production.' This implies a very high degree
of aggregation, but, as indicated earlier, limitations associated with the computation
of non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria severely restricts numerical analysis
dimensionality. Furthermore, given the highly conjectural nature of some of the
environment data we use, moving to a more detailed sectoral disaggregation would
not significantly improve the reliability of numerical estimates obtained from the
model.
In representing the regions, we include countries for the South which account
for a significant portion of key global environmental assets, such as tropical forest and
biological diversity. Table 18 identifies these countries and illustrates their importance
6 The non-traded goods sector contains all distribution, transportation, construction, utilities,
and government services. This corresponds roughly to 68% and 47% of GDP for the North and
South respectively.
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Table 18. Countries in the `S' Region in the Model and Their Tropical Forest Cover
Hectares 1990
(Thousands)
% of world
tropical forests
Angola 24,074 1.37
Bolivia 49,317 2.81
Brazil 561,107 31.95
Cameroon 20,350 1.16
Central African Republic 30,562 1.74
Colombia 54,064 3.08
Congo 19,865 1.13
Gabon 18,235 1.04
Guyana 18,416 1.05
India 51,729 2.95
Indonesia 109,549 6.24
Malaysia 17,583 1.00
Mexico 48,586 2.77
Mozambique 17,329 0.99
Myanmar 28,856 1.64
Papua New Guinea 36,000 2.05
Peru 67,906 3.87
Tanzania 33,555 1.91
Sudan 42,976 2.45
Venezuela 45,690 2.60
Zaire 113,275 6.45
Zambia 32,301 1.84
TOTAL 'S' REGION 1,441,325 82.07
WORLD 1,756,299 100.00
Source: World Resources Institute (1994)
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in the ownership of the tropical rain forest asset. The countries included in the South
region jointly control more than 80% of tropical forest and provide habitat for an
unknown but presumed considerable proportion of species.' The North we take to be
represented by OECD countries—who jointly reflect the environmental concern over
depletion of environmental assets and would be the lead players in any eventual trade
and environment negotiation in the WTO—and the rest of the world.
Table 19 reports the base year 1990 data on production by region and the
corresponding 1990-2090 discounted data. Table 20 gives share, elasticity and other
parameters. In calibrating the model, we select a value of 2 for Armington substitution
elasticities, a choice which is consistent with most model-based studies (e.g., Perroni
and Wigle, 1994); we subsequently vary this value for sensitivity analysis.
Parameters for the environmental portion of the model, are obtained as fol-
lows. The environment-using input coefficients by region have been computed from
input-output data for selected OECD countries. 8
 We make the strong assumption
that LDCs use the environment-using input in the two sectors in the same ratio as
they are used in OECD countries. We consider the following sectors as providing
environment-using inputs: agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying;
petroleum and coal products; electricity, gas and water; and construction. The initial
7 As is well-known, tropical ecosystems have a higher and more diverse number of species in a
given area than temperate ecosystems. It is estimated that between 40% and 90% of all species live
in tropical region habitats (World Resources Institute, 1994).
8The countries are Germany, United Kingdom and United States. The input-output data has
been taken from OECD (1995).
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Table 19. Production Data Used in Trade and Environment Model
North South
1990 GDP (Billion US dollars)	 20,942	 1,387
Discounted 1990-2090 GDP (Billion US dollars) 800,551 92,954
Table 20. Parameters for Trade and Environment Model
North South
Goods sub model
Calibrated share parameters
Imports in tradable demand 0.037 0.246
Non-tradeables in aggregate demand 0.681 0.473
Intra-regional trade in total trade 0.941 0.046
Substitution elasticities
Armington trade elasticities (o-) 2.0 2.0
Tradeables-non-tradeables substitution in consumption 1.0 1.0
Environment-using input-value added substitution n.a 1.0
Environment sub model
Overall environmental damage* n.a 10
Damage coefficients
Tradable n.a 0.22
Non-tradeables n.a 0.06
Elasticity of marginal valuation
with respect to income 1.25 1.25
n.a: not applicable
* As a % of North's GDP
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(1990) endowment of the environmental assets in the South, relative to which deple-
tion occurs, is set to be half of the North's GDP.' The value of base-case environmental
damage, in terms of depletion of the endowment of the South's environmental asset,
as valued by the North, is set to be equal to 10% of income in discounted value terms.
This is admittedly highly conjectural, but could be rationalized as follows. The an-
nual average depletion rate of tropical forests during the period 1981-90 was 0.6%
(World Resources Institute, 1994). Assuming that this depletion rate remains con-
stant throughout a 100-year period and assuming a quadratic damage function, the
estimate of physical damage for our period of analysis would amount to approximately
a 60% depletion of Southern environmental assets.
To impute a valuation for this damage, we can take Kramer and Mercer's
(1997) estimate for the US of willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid the destruction
of a certain area of tropical rain forest. We assume that this WTP changes with
income growth (assumed to be 2.5% a year) throughout our period, and use an income
elasticity of 1.25 (consistent with estimates obtained by Kramer and Mercer), to
obtain an estimate for the stream of environmental damages for the 100-year period.
Using a 5% discount rate, the present value of this stream is just above 10% of
the North's GDP. These calculations are sensitive to parameter assumptions and
in particular to the assumed damage function; at the same time, there exist other
9 Although this assumption is largely arbitrary, it has only second-order implications for the
behaviour of the model; specifically, it only affects the elasticity of the marginal valuation of envi-
ronmental quality, not its level (i.e., the model's behaviour for marginal policy changes is unaffected);
nevertheless, we perform sensitivity analysis on this parameter.
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important aspects of environmental damage (such as loss of biodiversity) which are
omitted from the calculation.
By choice of units we are able to set the marginal existence value of the
North (vN ) equal to unity. The South's existence value of the environmental asset is
calculated on the basis of the difference of per capita income between the two regions
and using again an elasticity of marginal valuation with respect to income of 1.25
(again, consistently with Kramer and Mercer's findings). This gives an estimate of
approximately 0.04 (relative to the North) for vs.
We stress the fact that the calibration of the environmental side of the
model relies on very strong assumptions on some key parameters. This is especially
the case with the initial value for the environmental asset and the shape of the dam-
age function, which crucially affects the elasticity of marginal valuation with respect
to damage and the share of the environmental asset in preferences. Although we
carry out sensitivity analyses on some key parameters—including the size of both the
environmental asset and damage—we emphasize that our data constraints necessar-
ily give our calculations a highly conjectural and illustrative nature—at least from a
quantitative standpoint.
4.3 Simulations and Results
We have used our parameterised model to analyse the implications for LD Cs
of a linked trade and environment negotiation. We employ this structure to first
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compute non-cooperative Nash equilibria of a tariff game (the disagreement point).
Because of their relatively small size, LDCs are at disadvantage relative to the North in
this non-cooperative equilibrium. A bargained trade outcome improves the developing
country situation a little relative to the disagreement point, but significant trade
barriers remain against LDCs. In contrast, a linked trade and environment bargained
outcome, where bargaining involves both trade and environmental policies, helps
LDCs since they can use their leverage in environmental policy (given the relatively
high existence value in the North) to help reduce Northern trade barriers against
them.
These features emerge strongly from our central case set of model results
summarized in Table 21. 10 Here we have taken the central case model specification
summarized above and computed non-cooperative Nash equilibria in tariffs, bargained
outcomes in trade (tariffs), and joint bargained outcomes covering both trade and en-
vironment policies. Trade elasticities are critical parameters in determining outcomes,
and in this specification we have used values of 2 for both North and South. As is
well known, as these values approach unity, in a symmetric case both regions optimal
tariffs would become large, and values significantly in excess of unity need to be used
to avoid numerical problems. Because the asymmetries in size in our model can lead
1 °In our tables, we adopt the zero tariffs and taxes scenario as a benchmark, to which all other
simulation results are compared. The idea is that such a scenario reflects the state of affairs at
the beginning of the 1990s, when significant trade cooperation had been achieved but tensions
over global environmental problems were relatively new. One could argue that a scenario featuring
optimal taxes from the South's point of view would provide a more natural benchmark; however,
since non-cooperative taxes are close to zero on our simulations, the difference between the two
scenarios is negligible.
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Table 21. Trade and Environment Bargaining: Central Case Results
Scenario
Non-cooperative
equilibrium
Tariff rates (%)
Bargaining
over trade
Bargaining
over trade and
environment
North	 500.00 253.63 0.0
South	 101.03 0.0 47.68
Environmental internalisation rate (%)*
North	 0.0 0.0 0.0
South	 0.41 0.41 54.10
Hicksian equivalent variation (% of GDP)
A. With respect to disagreement point
North	 0.0 0.57 6.53
South	 0.0 2.54 6.87
B. With respect to zero taxes and tariffs
North	 0.27 0.84 6.79
South	 -8.89 -6.35 -2.02
* Ratio of emission tax to marginal emission damage
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to large tariffs and associated numerical problems, we use an upper bound of 500%
for tariffs in both regions in computing model solutions.' However, this is not of
great significance since, well before tariffs reach such a high level, trade between the
two regions has virtually ceased.
In the central case non-cooperative equilibrium (first column of Table 21)
the South's internalisation rate is close to zero, consistent with most of the utility
loss from lowered environmental quality being borne by the North. The North's trade
barriers reach the upper bound of 500%, while the South's non-cooperative tariff rate
is around 100%. This difference in non-cooperative tariff levels reflects both differ-
ences in country size and the fact that under zero environmental internalisation in the
South, the North employs tariffs as a second-best environmental policy instrument.'
The South's loss from a trade war is close to 9% of GDP, whereas the North gains a
little relative to a free-trade scenario.
Bargaining over trade policies in the absence of side payments (column two
of Table 21) leads to an elimination of tariffs in the South and lowers tariffs in the
North to around 250%. This generates substantial gains in the South (2.54% of GDP),
which are significantly smaller than the almost 9.0% loss experienced by the South
under tariff retaliation.13
"We also rule out negative tariffs, which given our model structure, would never be used as an
optimal response.
12This also contributes to the high level of tariffs, although the finding of high non-cooperative tar-
iffs is, more fundamentally, a feature of Armington models featuring constant substitution elasticities.
13 Although we allow the non-cooperative level of internalisation to adjust endogenously, it remains
effectively unchanged (to the second decimal digit).
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In contrast, combining trade and environmental policies in a joint negoti-
ation makes it possible to sustain a level of internalisation in excess of 50%, and
leads to the total elimination of tariffs in the North. Some trade barriers remain in
the South, as a "concession" by the North in exchange for the higher internalisation
rate. In this outcome the South's gains in relation to a non-cooperative outcome are
considerable—almost 7% of GDP, and a linked trade and environment negotiation is
an attractive proposition to them.
As pointed out earlier, we can alternatively think of cooperation as reflecting
tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated game, I4
 where players maintain a cooperative
stance if the gains from unilateral defection are less than the discounted gains from
cooperation. By computing pay-offs for the various players under cooperation, non-
cooperation, and for unilateral deviations from cooperation, we could characterize the
maximum discount rate for which the threat of future punishment is effective as an
inducement to cooperate. To explore how linkage of trade and environment dimen-
sions affects the viability of cooperation, we could compare the maximum discount
values obtained for scenarios where dimensions of strategic interaction are considered
in isolation and where they are examined jointly. Given the regional asymmetries in
trade and environmental costs and benefits, without side payments it would never
be possible to sustain any form of cooperation in this model that is consistent with
"For an application of this approach to trade cooperation, see, for example, Bagwell and Staiger
(1993).
126
Table 22. Trade and Environment Bargaining with and without Side Payments
Hicksian equivalent variations (% of GDP)
Scenario
Central case
A. Relative to the disagreement point
Bargaining with
side payments
North 6.53 6.62
South 6.87 14.00
B. Relative to zero taxes and tariffs
North 6.79 6.89
South -2.02 5.11
Note: with side payments, tariff rates are equal to zero, and the environmental internalisa-
tion rate is equal to 100%
Pareto optimality, either in environmental policies or in trade policies, independently
of whether they are combined.
With explicit bargaining and lump-sum side payments (Table 22), on the
other hand, it is possible to achieve a first-best outcome with zero tariffs and 100%
internalisation. Introducing side payments overwhelmingly benefits the South, whose
gains more than double as a result. Compared to a situation with no intervention,
with cash transfers the South ends up with welfare gains which are high and not that
different from those of the North, even though Southern preferences for environmen-
tal quality are much weaker than Northern ones. Thus, compared to a negotiation
involving cash compensation for environmental restraint, the South gains far less from
a linked trade and environment negotiation. A linked trade and environment negoti-
ation with no side payments may be preferred to a trade-only negotiation, but may
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still be the wrong negotiation so far as the South is concerned. In reality, side pay-
ments are not often used; and without side payments it could be difficult to achieve
free trade even abstracting from environmental concerns. Thus, one might interpret
our results as showing that linkage can induce freer trade by providing an imperfect
substitute for income transfers.
We have performed sensitivity analysis of our central case results to the
Armington elasticities, the size of damage, and the North's existence value. This
shows that varying key parameters have mainly quantitative effects, leaving most of
our results qualitatively unaltered. Sensitivity analysis to the Armington elasticity
values suggests that an increase in trade elasticities to a value of 3 (Table 23), which
makes trade retaliation less damaging for the South, weakens opportunities for nego-
tiation linkage. As a result, the maximum level of internalisation that can be achieved
through linkage (not reported) is reduced. Results in Table 23 also show that, when
linkage is weakened through higher trade elasticities, a linked negotiation can make
the South worse off in comparison with a trade policy-only bargained outcome—a
finding not inconsistent with the comparative statics properties of Nash bargaining
solutions: a change which makes the utilities possibilities frontier more "skewed" in
favour of one region, can benefit both parties, but it can conceivably also result in
a lower level of utility for the other party. Intuitively, if there is more to be gained
by one party from moving policies in the direction it favours, the affected party will
become a "more concerned" negotiator. On the other hand, a reduction in trade elas-
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Table 23. Trade and Environment Bargaining: Sensitivity Analyses on Trade Elas-
ticities
Hicksian equivalent variations relative to zero taxes and tariffs (% of GDP)
Scenario
a = 2	 a = 3
(Central case)
A. Non-cooperative equilibrium
a = 1.25
North 0.27 0.24 0.11
South -8.89 -6.13 -11.98
B. Bargaining over tariffs
North 0.84 0.50 1.76
South -6.35 -0.72 -10.14
C. Bargaining over tariffs and env. policies
North 6.79 6.17 7.18
South -2.02 -1.78 -4.94
Table 24. Trade and Environment Bargaining: Sensitivity Analyses on Damage and
Existence Value
Hicksian equivalent variations relative to zero taxes and tariffs (% of GDP)
Scenario
Damage* 10 7.5 12.5 10
North's existence value 1 1 1 0.5
(Central case)
A. Non-cooperative equilibrium
North 0.27 0.05 0.59 -0.02
South -8.89 -4.61 -8.87 -4.88
B. Bargaining over tariffs
North 0.84 0.46 1.22 0.44
South -6.35 -3.72 -7.61 -3.75
C. Bargaining over tariffs and env. policies
North 6.79 4.43 8.41 2.84
South -2.02 -2.72 -1.85 -2.85
* As a % of North's GDP
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ticities (third column of Table 23) strengthens the potential for environment-trade
policy negotiation linkages, and makes it possible to achieve a level of internalisation
close to 100% even in the absence of side payments.
Table 24 reports sensitivity analyses to model parameters affecting the size of
damage and Northern existence value. When we decrease the level of damage (second
column of Table 24), the non-co-operative level of tariffs (not shown) in the North
is reduced. This is because the presence of environmental externalities in tradeables
production in the South generates an additional incentive for the North to curtail
trade, beyond the standard terms-of-trade large-country motive. In other words, the
presence of externalities induces the North to use trade policy as a substitute for
environmental policy. As externalities are reduced, so is the North's optimal tariff.
Negotiation linkage, however, remains strong. For higher levels of damage (third
column of Table 24), negotiation linkages become stronger as the North increases its
optimal tariff if the South does nothing to improve environmental quality. On the
other hand, a lower marginal valuation of damage by the North (last column of Table
8) has effects qualitatively similar to those of reducing the assumed level of damage,
with negotiation linkages remaining important, especially for the North.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
This Chapter has addressed the issue of whether LDCs should participate in
linked trade and environment negotiations in the WTO over the next few decades. We
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have developed a small dimensional global simulation model capturing both North-
South trade, and Southern use of environmental assets in trade-related production
when there is a high Northern existence value on such assets. The model has been
calibrated to data over a projected 100-year period from 1990 to 2090, in which
Southern countries are identified as those accounting for 80% of tropical assets (for-
est, species). We have computed various model solutions for alternative scenarios,
principally non-cooperative Nash equilibria for tariff games which serve as threat
points for cooperative bargaining (Nash) solutions, and similar solutions for linked
trade (tariffs) and environmental (taxes) policy games.
In our central case analysis, linking trade and environmental policies in a
joint negotiation expands the bargaining set and offers Southern LDCs an oppor-
tunity to exert discipline over Northern trade measures by making environmental
concessions. The South thus benefits from a linked negotiation compared to a stand
alone trade negotiation. However, in a negotiation with side payments, the South
gains considerably more, suggesting that LDCs should negotiate over cash for envi-
ronmental restraint rather than indirectly on trade and environmental policy instru-
ments. Sensitivity analysis suggests that as trade elasticities increase, and optimal
stand alone tariffs fall, the benefits of linkage fall to the point that Southern countries
benefit from being shielded from a trade and environment negotiation. Indeed, we
report cases where linked negotiations can be detrimental to the South, but this is
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crucially dependent on the (axiomatic) bargaining solution concept adopted and is
not true in our central case.
While model results are suggestive, our model parameterisation is heroic,
and there are missing features, reflecting developing country concerns over trade and
environment linkage, which are not captured here. Trade and environment linkage
could become the precedent for further wider linkage in trade negotiations, should
developing countries agree to participate (trade and labour standard, for instance).
Agreeing to the use of trade measures on environmental grounds would weaken the
MFN principle in GATT/WTO, so central to developing country interests in the
trading system. There is also ambiguity as to whether a cohesive Southern coalition
can really be formed to participate in such a negotiation. Furthermore, cooperation
in the GATT/WTO may not reflect a bargained agreement (which in the absence
of a supranational authority would effectively not be enforceable) but rather a non-
cooperative equilibrium supported by implicit triggered retaliation threats, which the
agreement only serves to ratify ex post. Under this interpretation, introducing an
environmental dimension alongside trade negotiations may inject instability into the
system, especially if policies are not observable (Riezman, 1991), and make retaliatory
episodes more likely.
CHAPTER 5
ADAPTATION, INTERNALISATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL
EXTERNALITIES
The literature on externalities begins with Pigou's (1924) identification of
the difference between marginal social and private benefits (or costs) and the need
to correct for this with a tax or subsidy. It continues with Coase's (1960) seminal
paper which identifies the importance of property rights in designing internalisation
instruments. This literature argues that the difference between alternative property
rights lies mainly in income distribution effects, and that prior bargaining (Coasian
deals) between the parties can (wholly or partially) internalize externalities before
any other policy instrument is used. Policy instruments designed in ignorance of such
bargaining can overcorrect for an externality.
This Chapter adds to this discussion by arguing that adaptation (or be-
havioural response) to the damage associated with externalities is a pervasive phe-
nomenon that can also affect internalisation instrument design. Examples of this
type of adaptation include individuals spending more time indoors when ultraviolet
radiation increases as damage to the ozone layer occurs; relocating upstream when
fishing stocks are adversely affected by pollution; moving between locations due to
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localised emissions; or switching travel times in order to avoid traffic congestion. We
argue that these behavioural responses need to be accounted for in any policy in-
tervention designed to internalize externalities. Ignoring them will typically produce
instruments which overcorrect for the externality.
In the case of traffic congestion, the externality widely thought to need
correction is that the average and marginal (or private and social) cost of driving dif-
fer, with the latter needing to be taken into account when making transit decisions.
With a labour-leisure choice underlying decisions of workers who travel, we argue
that the presence of damage (avoided by not working) also creates a wedge between
the marginal value product of labour and the marginal value of leisure, as individuals
adapt to the damage and modify their labour supply behaviour. Internalising con-
gestion externalities through a tax on transit which reduces the number of travellers
increases the wedge between the marginal product of labour and the marginal value
of time if there is diminishing marginal productivity of labour in the workplace. In
this case, neglecting the adaptation to damage overestimates (potentially sharply, as
we show later by numerical simulations) the true welfare gains from internalisation.
The issue has not been paid much attention to in the literature. In the
widely used environmental texts, such as Baumol and Oates (1988), and Pearce and
Turner (1990) we find no discussion of this adaptation issue. Classical papers in
transport economics, including Walters (1961), Johnson (1964), and Else (1981), and
recent texts such as Button (1993a), Button (1993b), begin from the proposition
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that appropriate internalisation of congestion externalities involves a transit tax re-
flecting the difference between average and marginal cost, and neglects the adaptive
behavioural responses we highlight here. 1
 Some of the literature on environmental
valuation comes much closer to the point we make here (e.g. Freeman, 1993; Smith,
1997). In a different context, Coase (1960) and Turvey(1963) has also made a similar
point. However, the welfare and policy instrument design implications we highlight
here are not discussed in detail in such work.
The point has wide application and potentially sharply changes the evalua-
tion of appropriate environmental policies.' We use a hierarchy of numerical models
of instrument design responding to congestion externalities in developing our theme,3
and appeal to OECD data in calibrating and parameterising them. In our first model
the structure is kept simple, with one produced good, work-related transit, and dam-
age in the form of congestion (time and traffic-related health effects). In this model
'Other literature examines the effects of congestion externalities on residential land use, empha-
sizing the distortion in land markets created by them (e.g. Arnott and MacKinnon, 1978; Henderson,
1975; Solow, 1973). Sullivan (1983a, 1983b), in particular, extends previous land-use models by in-
cluding a labour demand sector and considering not only residential land but also industrial and
transportation land, showing that unpriced congestion externalities distort housing, land and labour
markets, which, in turn, generate inefficiencies in commodity markets. None of this literature,
however, considers the adaptation effects on instrument design we stress here.
2 Recent econometric literature explores unintended consequences of environmental policy, but
does not make the link to the design of internalisation measures that we make here. Kahn (1998),
for instance, estimates the relationship between environmental quality improvement and household
migration in California.
3 In the models we present in this Chapter, the cost of adaptation behaviour is not modelled
explicitly or is assumed away. However, following the 'envelope theorem', if households have fully
optimised, marginal damage cost calculations can ignore adaptation behaviour. The implication is
that in settings where adpation costs have to be modelled separately, adaptation responses would
not matter. Thus, the point we make here would not apply to adaptation behaviour in general. We
are grateful to Alistair Ulph for pointing this out to us.
135
we consider labour-leisure responses as the vehicle for adaptation, with individuals
assumed to avoid damage by not working. We then consider a model with regional
labour mobility and region-specific congestion damage, where adaptation occurs in
the form of induced migration responses.
We consider various embellishments on this regional structure. One includes
local housing markets, with regional house prices adjusting to migration induced
by localized damage and acting to damp migration. Here, changes in house prices
reflect the adaptation response to region-specific damage. Another is region-specific
production-related damage in the form of utility loss for residents of the affected
region. Here, again, migration is the adaptation response, but two instruments are
needed to internalize the externality—a sector-specific production tax and a region-
specific labour subsidy.
The issue of allowing for adaptation responses in instrument design remains
the same through all these cases. Internalisation instruments designed as though
adaptation is not present differ significantly from those which take adaptation re-
sponses to damage into account. Typically, gains from internalisation are substan-
tially smaller than those in comparable models which ignore adaptation responses, as
are externality correcting taxes or subsidies. In the language of the literature on the
Coase theorem, the issue is not only whether partial internalisation of externalities
has occurred through Coasian deals, and so a simple Pigouvian tax overcorrects for
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them; it is also whether any adaptive response to the externalities has also taken
place.
5.1 Internalising Congestion Externalities in the Presence
of Labour Market Adaptation Responses
We first consider a simple model of congestion externalities in which labour
supply decisions adapt to the time loss in traffic in various ways. One is by modifying
the amount of labour supplied to the market; another is by relocating from cities to
rural areas. We build on literature which estimates the social costs of traffic-related
external effects in cities. These include excess time use in traffic, noise, elevated
accident rates, and the impact of sulphides, nitric oxides, and particulate matter on
human health, material damage and plant life. Khisty and Kaftanski (1986) some
years ago produced an estimate that the added social costs in the US were in the order
of 38 cents (at 1982 prices) per extra vehicle mile; perhaps 20 times the then price
of gasoline. 4 A more recent OECD (1994) report puts congestion-related additional
time use (relative to free flowing traffic) at 2-3% of GDP for OECD economies, noise
costs at 0.3%, accident costs at 1.5-2%, and local pollution at 0.4%; in total 4-6% of
GDP. For the UK, Newbery (1995) reports an estimate (for 1993) of congestion costs
from additional time use as equivalent to 3% of GDP.'
4 Khisty and Kaftanski (1986) also produced component estimates for extra travel time as (in
cents): air pollution (2), noise pollution (4), excess fuel consumption (11), additional accidents (13),
and others effects (11).
5 Small (1992) and Miller (1989) find cost of travel time figures for the US of 50% and 60% of
the hourly wage, respectively. More recently, Calfee and Winston (1998) have estimated the value
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These are large orders of magnitude, with seemingly significant gains achiev-
able from internalisation. Our point of departure is that with localized external effects
individuals can adapt to the damage they suffer if they travel to work. One simple way
is to reduce time supplied to the market, but other more subtle responses occur, such
as changing the time at which transit occurs. Because these effects are present in the
pre-intervention equilibrium, they affect the perceived welfare gain from internalising
the externality. A Pigouvian tax seeking to correct for the difference between average
and marginal damage which misses these adaptation responses typically overestimates
the gain.
5.1.1 Labour-Leisure Response
We make our argument by first examining a simple case of congestion exter-
nalities in the presence of a labour-leisure choice. We consider a short run, in which
additions to road capacity to deal with congestion are taken as infeasible. 6 The dam-
age function from congestion we consider is, for now, defined over the number of
workers in transit in urban areas, ruling out more sophisticated mechanisms through
of transit time for the US based on a willingness to pay (WTP) survey, and find an average WTP
per hour of 19% of the gross hourly wage, considerably smaller than other studies, though—unlike
OECD (1994)—it reflects time loss only.
6 Significant increases in capacity or infrastructure within (as against between) urban areas are
thus assumed away. This can be due to political opposition to new roads by existing residents,
unwieldy legal process for compensation, or other considerations.
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which existing urban residents can jointly reduce damage by, say, staggering transit
times to work.7
We consider the starting point for gains occurring from internalisation to
be one where Coasian bargaining has not already occurred. Motorists are thus not
jointly bargaining to mitigate congestion damage.
Given these assumptions, we consider a fixed number of workers, L, each of
whom has identical homothetic preferences. Each worker has a fixed endowment of
time, which we take to be unity. Workers decide on how much of their time to devote
to market activity (which requires transit, and hence congestion), and how much to
devote to leisure, which, for simplicity, we assume to be free of congestion. We denote
aggregate time devoted to production by all workers as L,L being measured net of
transit time. Market production is given by a decreasing returns to scale production
function:
Y = L';	 a < 1	 (5.1)
where Y denotes output. The parameter a is strictly less than one, and defines the
elasticity of output with respect to the labour input. The average product of labour
(YIL) exceeds the marginal product (aY/L). 8
 With the formulation used here rents
also accrue to an unspecified non-labour, fixed factor. We assume that these rents
7 1n reality, such mechanisms are clearly important, but we ignore them for now both to simplify
the analysis and to keep the focus on our main point.
8 Equation (5.1) can be reformulated as constant returns to scale by adding a fixed factor with a
Cobb-Douglas share (1-a).
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accrue to households (implicitly through ownership of the fixed factor) in lump-.sum
form.
We assume a damage function from congestion which is increasing in the
market-supplied labour input, L
D = AL7; 7 > 1	 (5.2)
where D represents total damage (here denominated in units of labour), D/L is the
damage per market participant, A and 7 are parameters of the damage function.
7 > 1 implies that marginal exceeds average damage.
We assume households have a utility function defined over goods (Y) and
leisure (E) consumed:
U =U(37,E)	 (5.3)
where
E = 1 — LIL— D/L	 (5.4)
The equation for E reflects an endowment of time per household of unity, market
labour supply per household of /4, and damage per worker (in time units) of D/L.
Households maximize utility subject to a cash budget constraint
L
PyY = W,
L
where Py is the price of the good, Y, and W is the market wage.
The externality that congestion creates in this case is that individual workers
respond to the private (or average) cost each of them faces in transit, not to the social
(5.5)
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(or marginal) cost. From (5.2), marginal damage exceeds average damage, and there
are gains to be had from internalisation. However, because of adaptation responses
to damage, a wedge also exists in the with-damage equilibrium between the marginal
value product of labour in goods production—which equals the wage rate—and the
marginal value of time in leisure consumption (marginal utility of leisure). Through
adaptation individuals can mitigate damage by not working, and hence equate the
market wage per unit of labour supplied to the market net of damage per unit of
labour supplied to the marginal utility of leisure. Thus, with adaptation, individual
choose labour supply such that
UE W[1 — (D/L)]1,)  
Uy_	 Py
where UE is the marginal utility of leisure, Uy the marginal utility from goods con-
sumption and Py is the price of Y.
In this case, internalisation instruments can reduce damage, but they also
alter the adaptation to the damage. A transit tax reduces output, and hence damage,
but in doing so it also further increases the marginal product of labour in goods pro-
duction. The distortion between the marginal product of labour in goods production
and the marginal value of time in leisure consumption is intensified by internalisation,
and the gain from internalisation is reduced.
(5.6)
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In contrast, if adaptation responses are not present, individuals equate the
market wage to the marginal utility of leisure. Consequently, labour supply is chosen
such that
UE W
= -
Uy Py
Damage still occurs, and affects market output through (5.2) and (5.4), but no inter-
nalising adaptation occurs. An optimal internalising transit tax based on (5.7) would
typically be larger than one based on (5.6), 9
 and so would be the perceived welfare
gains from internalisation. These effects occur simply because adaptation responses
to damage have already partially internalize the externality.
We illustrate these impacts of adaptation by calibrating the simple model set
out above to a 1995 UK data set on production, consumption, and congestion-related
damage and performing general equilibrium numerical simulations. We compute op-
timal internalisation tax rates, and the gains from instituting them, both in the
presence and the absence of adaptation responses. The calibration is based on UK
GDP in 1995 in the region of 700 billion pounds (1 trillion US dollars). Assuming a
work force of 25 million, this gives an annual income per member of the work force
9 In the absence of adaptation, the internalisation tax is given by the difference between marginal
damage (MD) and avergage damage (AD). With adaptation, the full internalisation tax rate is ob-
tained as follows. If individuals are assumed to respond to AD, rather than MD, the internalization
tax involved would be such that
(W — AD)(1 — = — MD)
where t is the tax rate. This implies
MD—AD
t =
W — AD '
which is smaller than the tax with no adaptation.
(5.7)
142
of around 40,000 US dollars. We use the labour share in the value of market produc-
tion implied by 1995 UK national account data (0.68), and take the leisure share in
expanded income (market income + leisure) to be 3/7.
For calibration on the environmental side, the OECD (1994) report we refer
to earlier cites two different estimates of economy-wide congestion-related costs; one
based on total time lost, equivalent to 8.5% of GDP, and the other 2-3% of GDP based
on time lost compared with free-flowing traffic. Combining the first estimate with
accident costs (1.5-2% of GDP), noise costs (0.3% of GDP) and local pollution costs
(0.9% of GDP) yields a total congestion-related damage figure of 11-12% of GDP.
Based on this figure, and trying to capture total rather than only congestion-related
damage, we take total base-case damage for the UK as being 10% of GDP.
Using these data, we are able to calibrate share parameters for goods and
leisure consumption for Cobb-Douglas preferences. Assuming a damage function
elasticity, -y (which we set equal to 1.5), we can then determine the other parameter,
A, of the damage function. Part A of Table 25 summarises both the data used in and
the parameters generated by these procedures.
Our simulation results (both in the presence and absence of adaptation
responses) are reported in Table 25. With adaptation responses, we show a transit
tax of 7.2% as being needed to achieve full internalisation, and an associated welfare
gain of 0.08% of GDP. This is an extremely small number compared to the damage
in the base case, but in the absence of adaptation responses it increases sharply.
(%)
7.2
0.08
-3.3
(%)
21.0
0.71
- 9.5
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Table 25. Internalising Congestion Damage in a Model with Labour-Leisure Choice
A. Specification of Base Case
UK GDP (billion pounds) 	 700
Congestion-related damage (billion pounds)	 70
Labour share in market production 	 0.68
Leisure share in expanded income (market income + leisure)
	 3/7
Share of goods in preferences (P G )	 0.56
Damage function elasticity (-y) 	 1.5
B. Internalisation Impacts with Adaptation Responses
Optimal tax rate on market labour supply
Internalisation gain (EV as % of GDP)
Change in labour supplied to the market
C. Internalisation Impacts with No Adaptation Responses
Optimal tax rate on market labour supply
Internalisation gain (EV as % of GDP)
Change in labour supplied to the market
Table 26. Sensitivity of Internalisation Impacts in Table 25
to Key Model Parameters
7=1.1 -y=2.0 13G=0.8
A. With Adaptation Responses(%)
Optimal tax rate on market labour supply 1.5 14.0 7.3
Internalisation gain (EV as % of GDP) 0.003 0.29 0.004
Change in labour supplied to the market -0.72 -5.7 -1.6
B. With No Adaptation Responses(%)
Optimal tax rate on market labour supply 16.0 26.1 21.5
Internalisation gain (EV as % of GDP) 0.42 1.1 0.36
Change in labour supplied to the market -7.6 -11.3 -5.0
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Gains from internalisation calculated as though there were no adaptation response
are nearly nine times larger, at 0.71% of GDP, and the optimal internalisation tax
rate is 21%. Market labor supply responses differ by a factor of nearly three across
those cases. Including or excluding adaptation responses to damage makes a large
difference to the design of appropriate instruments to internalise externalities.
Sensitivity analyses on the results from Table 25 using variations on key
model parameters are reported in Table 26, again for cases with and without adapta-
tion responses. These results suggest that the large differences between cases with and
without adaptation responses prevail. Increasing the elasticity of the damage function
(-y) increases the gains from internalisation since both average and marginal damage
increase. Variations occur in impact also under changed preference parameters, but
the theme of the importance of adaptation assumptions still prevails.
5.1.2 Interregional Labour Locational Response
A further way in which adaptation responses to congestion damage can occur
is where damage is localized and locational choice is present. To show how this further
element of adaptation response can affect instrument design, we build on the literature
on interregional labour mobility associated with Flatters, Henderson and Mieszkowski
(1974), Boadway and Flatters (1982), and Myers (1990), amongst others, and add
region-specific environmental considerations to the model above. Flatters, Henderson
and Mieszkowski show how local public goods financed by taxes on residents can
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generate inefficient migration, since wage differences across regions can be supported
by differences in individual benefits less taxes. In our structure, we assume damage
is region-specific, and that migrants respond by comparing the wage premium they
can receive if they remain in the affected region to the cost to them of the damage
they incur. Adaptation to damage in this case generates migration.
We consider an economy with two regions, labeled as U (for urban) and
R (for rural). Environmental effects occur in only one of the two regions, and affect
interregional labour migration. For now, we assume these are from congestion-related
effects within the U region, affecting only the region's residents. 1 ° We also assume
that labour is interregionally mobile.
We assume again that the economy has a fixed endowment of labour, L,
which can move costlessly between the two regions, and that each region has a de-
creasing returns to scale production function
Yi =	 j =U,R	 (5.8)
where Yi denote output, and P market supplied labour in region j. The terms ai
are, as above, strictly less than one, and define the elasticity of output with respect
to the labour input in region j, with the average product of labour exceeding its
marginal product. Rents again accrue to households (implicitly through ownership of
10 Thus, by working in the rural region workers avoid the commuting congestion of working in
cities; or, alternatively, all residents of urban areas bear congestion costs by living there, even if they
work elsewhere.
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fixed factors) from unspecified non-labour, region-specific fixed factors, in ways that
do not influence locational choice.
In this case, we assume a damage function which is increasing in the number
of residents in cities (Li'):
Du = A(Lu), 7 > 1	 (5.9)
where Du represents total damage in cities (here again denominated in units of
labour). D u/Lu is the damage per urban resident, and A and 7 are parameters
of the damage function. D R equals zero.
As the single good is homogeneous across regions, it has the same price
in both regions, and in equilibrium there is market clearing in both the good and
in the labour markets. Consumers in each region maximize utility subject to their
budget constraint and producers maximize profits. Because of interregional labour
mobility, equilibrium involves an equal-utility condition across regions. With identical
preferences for all consumers, interregional differences in wage rates are offset by the
value of damage for those locating in region U.
If adaptation behavioural responses are explicitly recognized, this yields the
equilibrium condition:
DuWu (1— Lu )=WR
If no adaptation responses enter, the equilibrium condition is
(5.10)
(5.11)
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We consider the internalisation instrument in this case to be a tax on inward
migration into the congested region (with the revenues distributed equally to residents
of all regions). In this case, a trade imbalance for regions is financed by tax revenues
received by the other region, and in such cases consumption in region j, C i , will not
necessarily equal regional output, Y i .
Efficiency conditions in the labour market in this case require that the
marginal damage inflicted on by a migrant, rather than the average damage per resi-
dent, should affect migration decisions. Thus, in this model, we have different market
equilibrium and efficiency conditions for the labour market. In the case where adap-
tation responses are present, the labour market equilibrium condition implies that
Wu (1 — )(Lu)_ i ) = W R ,	 (5.12)
while efficiency requires that
Wu (1 — A-y(Lur-1 ) = W R .	 (5.13)
These conditions imply that the marginal product of labour between the two regions
diverges. Any move towards internalisation through a tax on migrating labour will
once again affect adaptation responses to damage.
In Table 27 we provide a parameterisation for this model generated through
calibration. We again take the UK case, and use it as an example of an OECD country
with region-specific congestion. We first calibrate the model to a base case, and then
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Table 27. Internalising Congestion Externalities with Interregional Labour Mobility
A. Base Case Calibration
UK GDP (billion pounds)	 700
Share of labour in cities 	 0.6
Region-specific congestion-related
damage in the base case (billion pounds) 	 70
Share of labour in national income	 0.68
Damage function elasticity	 1.5
B. Internalisation Recognizing Adaptation (%)
Optimal tax rate on urban labour 	 3.7
Gain from internalisation (EV as % of GDP) 	 0.03
Change in urban labour 	 -3.4
C. Internalisation with No Adaptation (%)
Optimal tax rate on urban labour	 30.7
Gain from internalisation (EV as % of GDP) 	 2.2
Change in urban labour 	 -30.3
compute a counterfactual in which tax policies are used to internalize the congestion
externality, examining cases with and without adaptation responses. We use the same
production, labour force and congestion-related cost data as in the previous section,
but assume in addition that labour residing in congested regions reflects employment
in manufacturing (approximately 16% of total employment in 1995), plus one half of
employment in services. In combination, this is approximately 60% of the work force.
We again use a labour share in total value of production of 0.68, set 'y equal to 1.5,
and calibrate the values of A.
Results in part B of Table 27 show even larger discrepancies in the welfare
gains from internalisation in the presence and absence of adaptation responses. Gains
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from internalisation if adaptation responses are recognized are only 0.03% of GDP,
but 2.2% of GDP if their presence is ignored. Optimal tax rates with adaptation are
3.7%, but 30.7% in their absence, and the changes in labour migration across regions
differ by a factor of almost 10. Incorporating adaptation responses makes an even
larger impact than in our first model, both in terms of the setting of tax rates and in
the perceived welfare gains.
Table 28 presents sensitivity analysis results on the elasticity of the damage
function (7) as well as on the assumed size of damage in the base case. Results again
show that welfare gains from internalisation are sensitive to model parameter values
used, and particularly to the elasticity parameter used in the damage function; but
that the sharp differences across cases with and without adaptation responses persist.
These sensitivity analyses also show that the internalisation tax rate and the welfare
gain are inversely related to the size of damage to which the model is calibrated.11
5.2 House Prices and Migration
We next consider an extension to the regional migration model presented
above, in which region-specific house prices now enter the picture. 12 This extension
yields results in which adaptation effects now occur through housing markets. In this
11 The reason for this is that the internalisation tax rises the divergence between urban and rural
value marginal product of labour, offseting the reduction in damage and interregional wage rate
wedge induced by the tax.
I2 Indeed, in some literature it is common to use indirect measures of location-specific damage as
the change in land (or house) prices. See, for instance, some of the studies in Barde and Pearce
(1991) and Navrud (1992).
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Table 28. Sensitivity Analyses for Model with Interregional Labour Mobility
A. Alternative Parameter Configurations for Sensitivity Cases
Value of
au	 7	 damage
(% of GDP)
Share of
labour
in cities
Case 1 0.68 2.0 10 0.6
Case 2 0.68 1.5 15 0.6
Case 3 0.68 1.5 5 0.6
Case 4 0.68 1.5 10 0.75
Case 5 0.68 1.5 10 0.5
B. Internalisation Impacts with Adaptation (%)
Welfare Optimal Change
gain* tax on Lu in Lu
Case 1 0.25 12.1 -9.1
Case 2 0.0007 0.7 -0.5
Case 3 0.041 3.6 -4.8
Case 4 0.027 4.1 -2.5
Case 5 0.019 3.1 -3.2
C. Internalisation Impacts without Adaptation(%)
Welfare
gain*
Optimal
tax on Lu
Change
in Lu
Case 1 3.0 33.4 -31.9
Case 2 4.2 43.1 -38.9
Case 3 0.67 16.6 -18.3
Case 4 1.3 26.6 -18.4
Case 5 2.9 34.5 -38.9
* Hicksian EV as a % of GDP.
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model there are fixed endowments of houses in each of the regions; migration into one
region out of the other drives up house prices in the receiving region and drives prices
down in the labour donating region. The effects of region-specific externalities on
labour flows are therefore damped by adaptive house price effects, since these affect
the migration decision via changes in relative real wage rates across regions. In these
cases, potentially large redistribution under internalisation can also occur in favour of
those owning homes in the non-congested region prior to any intervention to achieve
internalisation.
More formally, we assume that in each region there is a pre-existing stock of
houses, Fr, RR. Houses are infinitely divisible—a larger proportion of the population
in a region implies that each individual (or household) lives in a smaller house. Houses
across regions are perfect substitutes in preferences, even though the separate fixed
housing stocks imply different prices of houses in each region in the presence of region-
specific external effects.
Household preferences are written as
U = U(Ci , Hi); j = U, R	 (5.14)
where Ci is the per person consumption of goods in region j, and Hi is the per person
consumption of housing in region j. We again use Cobb-Douglas functional forms for
(12) in which PG and H denote share parameters on goods and housing.
wU wR
7ru R (5.17)
and
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Given the common goods price, Pc, and the two region specific house prices,
PHu and PHR, we can construct region specific true cost of living indices from (5.14)
using the expenditure functions
7ri = ( Pc, Pio);	 j U,R	 (5.15)
These price indices appear in the migration condition (5.10) and (5.11) in the presence
and absence of adaptation responses in the form
WU ( DU) WR
- - 
=
u	 Lu	 7F R
(5.16)
and house prices influence migration decisions through the 71i variables in both the
with and without adaptation response cases.
Equilibrium prices for the good, rural and urban housing (in terms of the
numeraire, labour) are given by PH*	 such that
=Eya	 (5.18)
3
L= ELi+Du,
We again parameterise this model specification (with housing) using the UK
as a case representative of an OECD economy. In our base case, by choice of units
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the price of housing is unity in both urban and rural areas. We assume (through
the choice of Ir and RR) that 50% of housing (by value) is in urban areas in the
base case, and we specify a housing share in preferences of 0.20. We later carry out
sensitivity analyses on these parameter values.
Tables 29 and 30 report model results on the impact of internalisation taxes
in the presence of house price changes, with and without adaptation responses. Table
31 compares them with the corresponding no house price cases. Results in Table
29 once again show that incorporating adaptation responses sharply reduces optimal
tax rates. The presence of adaptive house price responses also substantially reduces
the welfare gains from internalisation and migration out of the urban areas. This is
the result of house prices falling in the cities and rising in rural areas as transit time
is taxed and people move out of the cities. This movement in house prices causes
migration towards the countryside to be smaller as internalisation occurs. House price
effects also induce a distributional impact against those residing in the cities before
internalisation.
Sensitivity analyses (Table 30) show that the large differences in cases with
and without adaptive responses prevail across various model parameterisations In-
creasing the damage function elasticity magnifies these results, while reducing the
labour output elasticity in the urban area yields changes in the opposite direction.
As in the model with no house prices, increasing the size of the damage in the base
case reduces the gain from internalisation. Results in Table 31 examine various cases
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Table 29. Internalisation with Regional House Price Effects
A. Specification of base case
UK GDP (billion pounds)	 700
Share of labour in cities 	 0.6
Congestion-related damage (billion pounds)	 70
Share of labour in national income	 0.68
Share of national housing value
terms in urban area	 0.50
Share of housing in preferences 	 0.20
B. Internalisation with Adaptation Responses (%)
Optimal tax rate on urban labour 	 2.7
Gains from internalisation*
	 0.01
Change in labour in cities	 -1.3
C. Internalisation without Adaptation Responses (%)
Optimal tax rate on urban labour 	 25.5
Gain from internalisation*
	
1.0
Change in labour in cities	 -14.1
* Hicksian EV as a % of GDP.
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Table 30. Sensitivity Analyses for Model with Regional House Price Effects
A. Alternative Parameter Configurations
Value of Share of
au 7 PG damage
(% of GDP)
labour in
cities
Case 1 0.68 2.0 0.8 10 0.6
Case 2 0.68 1.5 0.7 10 0.6
Case 3 0.68 1.5 0.8 15 0.6
Case 4 0.68 1.5 0.8 10 0.75
B. Internalisation Impacts with Adaptation (%)
Welfare
gain*
Change
in Pll
Change
in P fi
Case 1 0.10 -5.4 10.1
Case 2 0.007 -1.3 2.4
Case 3 0.0003 -0.3 0.5
Case 4 0.007 -0.9 3.2
C. Internalisation Impacts without Adaptation (%)
Welfare
gain*
Change
in Pli
Change
in Pfi
Case 1 1.5 -20.8 37.5
Case 2 0.73 -13.9 24.0
Case 3 2.0 -24.7 44.3
Case 4 0.41 -7.9 26.4
* Hicksian gains as a % of GDP.
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Table 31. Comparing Results of Internalisation with and without House Price Effects
(%)
Model
variant
Welfare
gain*
Tax on
IP (%)
Change in
Lu (%)
Central case NHPE 0.03 3.7 -3.4
Central case HPE 0.01 2.7 -1.3
7 = 2 NHPE 0.25 12.1 -9.1
•-y = 2 HPE 0.10 8.7 -3.7
Damage Value
(% GDP) = 15 NHPE 0.0007 0.7 -0.5
Damage Value
(% GDP) = 15 HPE 0.0003 0.4 -0.2
Share of labour
in cities = 0.75 NHPE 0.027 4.1 -2.5
Share of labour
in cities = 0.75 HPE 0.007 2.7 -0.5
HPE : House price effect
NHPE : No house price effect
* EV as % of GDP
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where adaptation responses are present and shows smaller welfare gains from inter-
nalisation compared to no-house-price models since a lower of people moves into R
as house prices there rise while in U fall.
5.3 Adaptation to Production-based Externalities
Besides labour supply, locational choice, and house prices, several other
adaptation responses to environmental damage occur. In this final section to the
Chapter one more is analysed—adaptation to region-specific production-related dam-
age, rather than congestion-based damage. In this case, two goods (a clean and a
dirty good) enter the analysis, with damage reflecting the production of the dirty
good in cities. Adaptation-based migration now results from utility-based damage,
rather than a time loss. Importantly in these cases, two interventions (a production
and a labour market tax or subsidy) are needed to restore efficiency; a simple Pigou-
vian production tax will not suffice to fully internalize the externality. The need of
using two policy instruments in similar situations seems to have first been raised by
Coase (1960), although without exploring in detail welfare implications.
We again consider an economy with two regions—which, as before, we label
urban (U) and rural (R)—and a fixed endowment of labour, L. Labour can again
costlessly move between regions. We consider two goods, clean (C) and dirty (D),
each of which can be produced in each region with a decreasing returns to scale
technology
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Y= (L.1) 4 ; c < 1; j== U, R; i= C, D
	
(5.19)
where denote outputs and 14 denote labour inputs. The 4 terms are again
strictly less than one, and are equal to the elasticity of output with respect to labour
inputs for each good in each region. The average product of labour again exceeds
the marginal product of labour in all industries. Goods are traded and homogeneous
across regions, and have the same price (Pi ) in both regions.
We consider a case where damage is caused by the production of the dirty
good in the urban region, and only impacts residents of cities. We assume that
damage takes the form of emissions which lower environmental quality in U. We
model environmental quality supply and demand as in the previous Chapter. Thus,
we assume an exogenous initial endowment of environmental quality and a fixed
coefficient damage function:
Du = 011	 (5.20)
where D u defines the damage in the cities (in units of reduced environmental quality),
o is the damage per unit of production of the dirty good, and YE is the production of
the dirty good in the cities. D R equals zero. Note that given the public good nature
of environmental quality, average and total damage in U are the same.
Effective environmental quality in each region, Qi , is then given by
= — Di; j = U, R	 (5.21)
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where IQ is environmental quality before damage occurs.
We assume identical preferences for all consumers, with preferences defined
over consumption of goods,CI, and environmental quality in each region. Thus,
= Ui (CLQi); i = C, D; j = R,U	 (5.22)
Households maximize utility subject to their budget constraint
iti Qj =	 (5.23)
where tti represents the shadow price (or marginal valuation) of environmental qual-
ity, and P is expanded income. Trade between regions can again be generated by
inteinalisation policy interventions, such as a Pigouvian production tax on the dirty
industry in the cities. Hence Ct will not necessarily equal
In equilibrium, consumers in each region maximize utility subject to their
budget constraint, but because of interregional labour mobility, equilibrium now in-
volves an equal-utility condition across regions as well as market clearing in goods and
labour. Thus with identical goods prices and preferences across regions, differences
in wage rates are offset by the value of production-related damage for those residing
in region U.
In the special case where we write (5.22) in separable form as the utility
function per urban resident, i.e.
U = U(Cil ) + V (Di )	 (5.24)
wu V(Di) 
MU I
(5.25)
aDu
•9Lu — Dv LUD' (5.26)
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we assume that the same damage V(Di) accrues to all residents of cities, but again,
given that Q is a public good, the value of average and total damage are the same.
Migration equilibrium in the presence of adaptation responses requires
where Wu and W R are urban and rural wage rates, and MU I is the marginal utility
of income.
In the presence of uninternalised damage, (5.25) will not satisfy the condi-
tions required for Pareto optimality. For efficiency, the wage rate differential (the
difference in the value marginal product of labour across regions) should equal the
value of damage in the region caused by the re-location of one extra migrant rather
than the value of damage suffered by each city resident. Since the marginal product
of labour in each region is falling, and as damage is a fixed coefficient multiple of
output, marginal damage will be below average damage. This can be seen also by
comparing the expression for average damage per urban resident implied by (5.20)
with that for marginal damage, which is given by
with aup <1.
An implication of this structure is that, in this case, a physical externality
creates a second external effect as migrants respond to average, not marginal damage.
As a result, to achieve internalisation more than one instrument is needed (i.e. more
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than a Pigouvian, or production, tax on dirty output in U). An additional instrument,
a region-specific labour subsidy or an interregional transfer, is needed.
We have used a structure incorporating these additional features to once
again analyse the impacts of internalisation in the presence and absence of adaptation
responses. In the numerical implementation we employ UK production and labour
force data as in the model from the last section, but we now disaggregate this by
industry (clean and dirty). We take the dirty industry to consist of manufacturing
and transport activities, which jointly account for approximately 25% of UK GDP.
We assume that production of dirty goods (and services) takes place in urban areas
only, and that approximately two thirds of clean output is generated in the cities.
A substitution elasticity in preferences of 1.5 is used for goods consumption in each
region, and goods share parameters are determined through calibration.
We take the value of local environmental damage to be 1% of GDP—roughly
consistent with estimates from OECD (1994). this estimate, and assuming
Cobb-Douglas preferences for goods and environmental quality, and an elasticity of
marginal valuation of environmental quality with respect to damage of 0.5 (the value
used in Perroni and Wigle, 1994), we can simultaneously calibrate the model to an
initial endowment of environmental quality (Q) and a share parameter on environ-
"This estimate corresponds to the sum of the costs of noise and local pollution (in terms of health,
and material and vegetation damage) for the UK in OECD (1994).
162
mental quality in preferences. In the process, we choose units such that the marginal
valuation of environmental quality is unity in both regions."
Table 32 (Part A) presents and summarizes the parameters and data we use
in a production-based damage model. The results show smaller differences between
the adaptation and no-adaptation response cases. Note that a the use of only a tax
on dirty output yields only part of the gains achievable through internalisation. To
achieve full gains, a subsidy on urban labour must be employed (Table 32, Part B).
As indicated earlier, this is because workers make decisions on migration on the basis
of average rather than marginal (smaller) damage, which causes too many people to
leave the cities if only a production tax is used.' We note that the use of a subsidy
induces an increase in the production tax as well. This is because the subsidy, in
making urban labour cheaper, causes dirty industry output to increase and further
deteriorates environmental quality; the tax increase corrects for this effect.
5.4 Conclusion
In this Chapter we have argued that adaptive responses by agents can signif-
icantly affect the design of policies aiming to internalise environmental externalities.
These effects occur where households or firms directly modify their behaviour in re-
14 Here, we depart from the previous Chapter both in the calibration of the environment-side
parameters and the modelling of marginal valuation of environmental quality.
15 When only a production tax is used, the number of residents in the urban area falls by 1.3%;
whereas when a subsidy is also introduced, the number of city residents rises by 0.9% (compared to
the non-intervention scenario).
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Table 32. Internalisation Effects in a Model with Production-Based Damage
A. Specification of Base Case
UK GDP (billion pounds)	 700
Share of labour in cities 	 0.6
Share of labour in national income	 0.68
Labour output elasticity
Urban	 0.68
Rural	 0.68
Preferences elasticity	 1.5
CES shares
Clean.Rural	 0.5
Clean.Urban	 0.5
Share of goods in preferences
Rural	 0.93
Urban	 0.97
Damage (billion pounds) 	 7.0
B. Impacts of Internalisation Taxes (%)
	Wi h	 Without
Adaptation Adaptation
Welfare gain* from instituting
both an optimal production tax
and a labour subsidy in cities 	 0.019	 0.022
Welfare gain* from instituting
only optimal production tax	 0.007	 0.021
Optimal production tax rate on
YZ when no labour subsidy is used 	 2.1	 3.6
Optimal production tax when
subsidy to	 is used	 4.25	 4.18
Optimal subsidy rate on LY	 2.4	 0.65
* Hicksian EV as a % of GDP.
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sponse to environmental damage. Examples include modifying labour supply due
to time lost in traffic, moving between locations due to localised emissions, working
indoors because of ultraviolet radiation from damage to the ozone layer. We mainly
focus on adaptation to congestion-based damage in cities (time loss, noise, accidents,
health effects) to illustrate our argument.
We use models calibrated to UK and OECD studies data, as well as to esti-
mates on the division of the labour force between urban and rural areas. We develop
a hierarchy of ever more complex models in which house-price effects (which dampen
mobility) and production externality effects are taken into consideration and gener-
ate various adaptation responses. In all cases, adaptation responses to damage occur
and affect pre-internalisation equilibrium outcomes and partially internalize the costs
of damage. Both gains from internalisation and tax rates needed to restore Pareto
optimality are considerably smaller than in models which do not take adaptation into
account. Our conclusion is that adaptation responses to damage are important for
environmental policy design, and not taking them into consideration can seriously
mislead analyses of the consequences of internalising environmental externalities.
CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has used general equilibrium numerical simulation techniques to
examine trade and environmental issues. It has tried to go beyond the traditional
confines of applied general equilibrium modelling by adding features such as inter-
national capital mobility and cooperative and non-coperative solution concepts. It
has also tried to go beyond traditional counterfactual experiment analysis and used
models to decompose observed changes derived from various sources into portions
attributable to each source.
On the trade side, we have analysed the effects of trade liberalisation in
small open economies both in the presence and absence of foreign direct investment
flows and their taxation. Using data both for Costa Rica and El Salvador, we have
found that, in the absence of FDI flows, the welfare gains from trade liberalisation
are quite small, but positive. Using Costa Rican data in a model where such capital
movements are present and foreign capital is taxed in accordance with foreign tax
credit system rules, welfare gains might become even negative. In fact, complete
tariff elimination will, in this case, reduce welfare in a small open economy.
We have also use a trade model to decompose the relative wage change that
occurred in the UK during 1976-90 into trade and technology-related constituents
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parts. We have compared decomposition results for different institutional arrange-
ments in the market for unskilled labour, and found that the way in which labour
markets are modelled makes a substantial different to the decomposition. Specifi-
cally, when labour markets are fully flexible, technology is by far the principal factor
responsible for increased wage inequality; whereas, when the unskilled labour market
is inflexible due to the presence of a real minimum wage, trade can become the main
force.
As to the environment side, we have analysed the issue of the incentives for
developing country participation in possible future trade and environment linked ne-
gotiations within the World Trade Organization. We have computed non-cooperative
and cooperative (bargaining) solutions with and without side payments of cash, us-
ing a North-South model incorporating trade and environmental assets. Our main
finding has been that developing countries would benefit from a linked trade and
environment negotiation with their developed counterparts, compared with a trade
negotiation only. In a negotiation with side payments, however, developing countries
do considerably better, suggesting that they should negotiate over cash for improved
environmental management rather than over trade and environmental instruments.
Using a hierarchy of models, we have also examined the importance of adap-
tation responses to environmental externalities. We have considered models with
labour-leisure choice and regional labour mobility, which we have calibrated to UK
data and used to compute the optimal level of various internalisation instruments-
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both in the presence and absence of adaptation responses to environmental damage.
Our main finding has been that adaptation responses make a considerable difference
to both the optimal level of internalisation instruments and the welfare gains from
instituting these, driving both of them downwards in comparison with the case where
adaptation responses are absent. Our conclusion is that not taking into account
adaptation responses to environmental damage can seriously mislead analyses of the
consequences of internalising environmental externalities.
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